On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard by Baker, Tom
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1996 
On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard 
Tom Baker 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Insurance Commons, Insurance Law Commons, 
Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, 
Theory and Philosophy Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Repository Citation 
Baker, Tom, "On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard" (1996). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 872. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/872 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Texas Law Review 
Volume 75, Number 2, December 1996 
Articles 
On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard 
Tom Baker* 
Much of our current legal and political debate addresses a familiar 
question: To what extent are those who suffer responsible for their condi­
tion? In such diverse contexts as welfare reform, tort liability, workers' 
compensation, and health policy, we debate this question and a corollary : 
What obligations do we have to prevent or alleviate the suffering of others? 
(And, who are "we"? Who is "other"?) 
In the legal academy and elsewhere, these questions increasingly are 
debated within the framework of what in law schools is called law and eco­
nomics analysis (and elsewhere is called rational choice theory, neoclassical 
economics, or, sometimes, simply policy analysis). Within that frame­
work, the concept of "moral hazard" is one of the most important, and 
least well understood, of the analytical tools applied to these and other 
social responsibility questions. Whether the topic is products liability law, 
workers' compensation, welfare, health care, banking regulation, bankrupt­
cy law, takings law, or business law, moral hazard is a central part of the 
law and economics explanation of how things as they are came to be. 1 
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1. See, e.g., WILLARD G. MANNING & M. SUSAN MARQUIS, RAND CORPORATION, HEALTH 
INSURANCE!: THH TRADEOFF BEITWEHN RISK POOUNG AND MORAL HAzARD (1989); STEVEN SHA VELL, 
------""''-· I 
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Perhaps the best way to illustrate the ubiquity of the moral hazard lens 
on social responsibility is to note its presence on the op-ed page in Middle 
America, where one writer succinctly described the "lesson of moral 
hazard" as follows: 
What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences 
of bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior. The lesson 
of moral hazard is that less is more.Z 
As this passage reflects, the conventional lesson taken from the economics 
of moral hazard is that "less is more": Less welfare means more Ameri­
cans out of poverty; less products liability means safer homes; less work­
ers' compensation means safer workplaces; less disability insurance means 
more people without disabilities; and less health insurance means more 
healthy people. 
This Article questions this extraordinarily counterintuitive (and, I will 
assert, largely counterfactual) "less is more" lesson by investigating the 
genealogy of moral hazard: what Nietzsche would have called the "cause 
of the origin of' moral hazard as well as "its eventual utility. "3 In the 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21, 26 (1987 ) (tort law and moral hazard); RICHARD E. 
WAGNER, To PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: MARKET PROCESSES VS. POLITICAL TRANSFERS 164-
70 (1989) (transfer payments and moral hazard); James R. Barth et a!., Moral Hazard and the Thrift 
Crisis: An Empirical Analysis, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 22 (1990) (banking regulation and moral 
haZl'.rd); Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984) (takings law and moral hazard); Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Claims 
Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers Compensation, 58 J. RISK & INs. 191, 202 
(1991) (workers' compensation and moral hazard); Richard A .  Epstein, Products Liability as an 
Insurance Market, 14 J. LEG. STUD . 645, 666 (1985) (products liability and moral hazard); Jon D .  
Hanson & Kyle D .  Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for 
Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 137-41 (1990) ( products liability and moral hazard); 
Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 512 (1994) (banking regulation and moral hazard); Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy 
and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 65, 67-78 ( pension regulation, bankruptcy, and moral hazard); 
Reinier H. Kraak.man, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 
357, 873-74 (1984) (business law and moral hazard); Mancur Olson, A Less Ideological Way of 
Deciding How Much Should Be Given to the Poor, DAEDALUS, Fall 1983, at 217 (welfare and moral 
hazard); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1313-14 
(1981) ( products liability and moral hazard). 
2. JamesK. Glassman,Drop BudgetFight, Shift to Welfare, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb.ll, 
1996, at B3. The Detroit News captioned its editorial on the Million Man March, Moral Hazards: In 
Washington . . .  , and wrote: 
Mr. Farrakhan is right when he argues that the black man has suffered a kind of 
oppression. But the oppression in Washington comes from too much government, not too 
little. It comes from policies that punish success and reward failure. If the Washington 
marchers really want to inaugurate a new era of unity and prosperity, they should seek 
policies that are consistent with their rhetoric about taking personal responsibility for their 
lives. That means reforms which reduce dependence on government rather than increase 
it. 
Moral Hazards: In Washington . . . , THE DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 15, 1995, at 12A. 
3.  FRlEDRlCH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 77 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage 
Books 1967 ) (1887 ).  By "cause of the origin" of a phenomenon, Nietzsche means to focus on the con-
-
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economics literature and in the law and policy debate that draws upon this 
literature, "moral hazard" refers to the tendency for insurance against loss 
to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.4 Within this 
framework, welfare can be understood as insurance against being without 
a job or other source of economic support, workers' compensation as insur­
ance against work-related injury, and products liability as insurance against 
product-related injury. Because all insurance affects incentives to reduce 
loss, welfare will increase poverty, workers' compensation will increase 
worker accidents, and products liability will increase consumer accidents. 
This is the "moral hazard" of welfare, workers' compensation, and prod­
ucts liability. It is backed up by an impressive array of mathematical 
proofs and solutions; and it is the intellectual backbone of the effort to cut 
back products liability law, reduce workers' compensation, and "end 
welfare as we know it." 
Appearances to the contrary, moral hazard has never been a straight­
forward, purely logical or scientific concept. It had a nonrational, per­
formative dimension for the nineteenth-century insurers who coined the 
term, just as it does today. In the nineteenth century, addressing moral 
hazard signified the morality of the insurance enterprise at a time when that 
morality was in substantial doubt; the concept of moral hazard also helped 
deny that insurance broke with conventional morality, even as insurance 
practices began to replace individual responsibility with social 
responsibility. 
Today, moral hazard signifies the perverse consequences of well­
intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life, and it also helps deny that 
refusing to share those burdens is mean-spirited or self-interested. Indeed, 
using the economics of moral hazard, it is but a short step to claim, in one 
ditions in which the phenomenon arose and to understand those conditions as they were. Nietzsche 
emphasizes that "the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and 
place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is 
again and again reinterpreted to new ends . . . .  " Id. 
4 .  The leading articles setting out the economics of moral hazard include: Kenneth J .  Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON .  REV. 941 (1963) [hereinafter 
Arrow, Uncertainty); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcON. REV. 
53 1 (1968) [hereinafter Pauly, Comment]; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further 
Comment, 58 AM. EcON. REv. 537 (1968) [hereinafter Arrow, Further Comment]; Richard 
Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate 
Incentives, 2 J .  EcON. THEORY 10 (1970); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S .  Becker, Market Insurance, Self­
Insurance and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and 
Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88  Q .J .  EcON. 44 
(1974); John M .  Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1976); Steven Shavell, On Moral 
Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q .J.  EcoN. 541 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 
10 BELL J .  EcoN. 74 (1979); and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory 
of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RlsK & INs. 4 (1983) .  There are many more recent contribu­
tions to the literature, some of which will be referred to in Part II of this Article. See infra notes 1 8 1 ,  
183,  186, & 202. 
-----=<;t;;i, I 
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economics literature and in the law and policy debate that draws upon this 
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Appearances to the contrary, moral hazard has never been a straight­
forward, purely logical or scientific concept. It had a nonrational, per­
formative dimension for the nineteenth-century insurers who coined the 
term, just as it does today. In the nineteenth century, addressing moral 
hazard signified the morality of the insurance enterprise at a time when that 
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again and again reinterpreted to new ends . . . .  " I d. 
4. The leading articles setting out the economics of moral hazard include: Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM . EcoN . REv. 941 (1963) [hereinafter 
Arrow, Uncertainty]; Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM . EcON. REv. 
53 1 ( 1968) [hereinafter Pauly, Comment]; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further 
Comment, 58 AM . EcON. REV. 537 (1968) [hereinafter Arrow, Further Comment]; Richard 
Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate 
Incentives, 2 J. EcON . THEORY 10 (1970); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self­
Insurance and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 ( 1972); Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and 
Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88  Q.J. EcoN. 44 
(1974); John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM . EcoN. REv. 880 (1976); StevenShavell, On Moral 
Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q .J. EcoN. 541 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 
10 BELL J. EcON. 74 ( 1979); and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory 
of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RisK & INs. 4 (1983). There are many more recent contribu­
tions to the literature, some of which will be referred to in Part II of this Article. See infra notes 1 81, 
1 83 ,  1 86, & 202. 
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economist-politician's memorable words, that "[s]ocial responsibility is a 
euphemism for individual irresponsibility. "5 By "proving" that helping 
people has harmful consequences, the economics of moral hazard justify 
the abandonment of legal rules and social policies that try to help the less 
fortunate; and, by providing a "scientific" basis for the abandonment of 
legal rules and social policies, the economics of moral hazard legitimate 
that abandonment as the result of a search for truth, not an exercise of 
power. 
In that sense, the cultural meaning of moral hazard has come full 
circle-from legitimating the expansion of redistribution in the nineteenth 
century to limiting that redistribution today. Yet, conventional economic 
accounts of moral hazard exaggerate the incentive effects of real-world 
insurance and, at the same time, underestimate the social benefits of insur­
ance. As a result, the economics of moral hazard sy stematically -and 
wrongly-undervalue efforts to protect the injured, the sick, and the poor, 
and absolve the more fortunate of their responsibility for that situation. 
The real lesson of moral hazard should be that the world is a relational web 
that cannot be reduced to truisms-not the op-ed writer's "less is more" 
and not the "insurance-deterrence" tradeoff of the economist's theoretical 
model.6 
Part I of this Article describes the origin of the concept of moral 
hazard in the nineteenth-century fire insurance trade, where it grew from 
seeds planted in probability theory and marine insurance. 7 Like the con­
cept of moral hazard today, the nineteenth-century concept of moral hazard 
had both a technical meaning and a larger cultural significance. For nine­
teenth-century insurers, "moral hazard" represented an unwholesome mix 
of bad character and temptation which the insurers had a responsibility to 
ferret out from the insurance enterprise. 8 The concept's significance lay 
not in the recognition that insurance could have undesirable consequences 
(which was widely believed at the time)/ but instead in the claim that the 
undesirable consequences could be controlled. 
To control these undesirable consequences, insurers would do two 
things. They would refuse to insure "moral hazards" -that is, people with 
5. DICK ARMEY, THE FREEDOM REVOLUTION 317 (1995); see also David S. Broder, Armey's 
Axioms, WASH . POST, June 21, 1995, at A21 (reviewing THE FREEDOM REVOLUTION, supra, and 
reporting that Mr. Armey, the U. S. House of Representatives Majority Leader and co-author of the 
Contract with America, holds a doctoral degree in economics). 
6. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 6 ("[T]he more and better insurance that is provided against 
some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less they 
bear the full consequences of their actions."). 
7. See infra subparts I(A-B). 
8. See infra subpart I(C). 
9. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 45, 42-46 (1979) (documenting nineteenth-century resistance to tl1e 
life insurance industry for transforming "man's sacred life" into an article of merchandise). 
-
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bad characters. And they would structure the insurance contract so that it 
did not create a "moral hazard" -that is, so that insurance did not encour­
age the wicked to apply or tempt good people to do wrong. Together, 
these efforts helped to exorcise the specter of immorality from the insur­
ance trade and facilitated the late nineteenth-century transformation of in­
surance to a mass consumer enterprise. 10 
Part II begins by describing how neoclassical economists adopted and 
transformed the insurance trade concept of moral hazard. Against the in­
surers' claim that they could eliminate the immoral from insurance, the 
economists' models demonstrated, instead, that insurance inevitably in­
creases the occurrence, magnitude, or cost of that which is insured against. 
Economists dispensed with the insurers' notion of "character" and changed 
the theologically loaded "temptation" into an insurance "incentive. "11 In 
the process, economists generalized the concepts of "insurance" and 
"moral hazard" so that they could be seen, not only in relationships with 
traditional insurance institutions such as insurance companies and the Social 
Security Administration, but in all relationships involving risk. 12 Indeed, 
through the lens of neoclassical economic theory, we can see insurance and 
moral hazard at work in corporate organization, bankruptcy law, employ­
ment relations, the family, and even courtship relations . 13 
Part II then examines the assumptions about people and their situations 
reflected in the economics of moral hazard. This examination takes as a 
given that people act in a manner consistent with the (much-criticized) 
vision of rational action that undergirds law and economics analysis/4 not 
10. See infra subpart I(D). Understanding this history is important, not only as background for 
the economists' moral hazard, but also because it shows how long and consistently insurers have stereo­
typed outsiders and minorities. As an examination of insurance trade literature reveals, charaCter 
underwriting often amounted to underwriting by stereotype. See Carol A. Heimer, The Racial and 
Organizational Origins of Insurance Redlining, 10 J. INTERGROUP REL. 42, 47, 46-47 (1982) ( describ­
ing the link between character underwriting and the assumption that "immigrants and blacks were poor 
risks"); see also infra notes 80-82, 144 and accompanying text. If, as I claim, underwriting by stereo­
type helped to legitimate insurance as a culturally acceptable, "moral" business, then it is no wonder 
that insurers face claims of discrimination today. See, e.g. , Homeowners' Insurance Discrimination: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., at title page 
(May 11, 1994) (discussing the "availability, affordability, and accessibility of homeowners' insurance, 
particularly in urban neighborhoods"). 
11. See infra subpart II(A). 
12. See infra subpart II( B). 
13. See, e.g. , sources cited supra note 1; see also CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND 
RA T!ONAL ACTION: MANAGING MoRAL HAzARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 220-26 (1985) (discussing 
moral hazard in courtship); Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Moral Hazard and Nonmarket 
Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?, 81 AM. EcON . REV. 179 (1991) 
(discussing "non-market" insurance such as support from family and friends in the context of moral 
hazard). 
14. By "rational action" or "rational choice," economists mean "that man is a rational maximizer 
of his ends in life." RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (4th ed. 1992) (citation 
omitted). For sympathetic discussions of the limits of the rational actor assumption and an introduction 
·�;�----
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because I agree that this assumption reflects how people actually behave, 
but rather to focus attention on other assumptions built into the economists' 
moral hazard model . As Part II will discuss, the situations in which we act 
often conflict with these other assumptions . For example, the moral hazard 
model assumes that money fully compensates for loss, that individuals are 
in control of loss-producing behavior, and that insurance institutions do not 
ameliorate the incentive effects of insurance. 15 In the context of work­
place and products injuries (as well as other situations I will explore) , these 
assumptions plainly are not met. The moral hazard model's failure to con­
sider and address adequately these assumptions explains how the economics 
of moral hazard have been deployed in a fashion that systematically favors 
the interests of manufacturers and employers over the sick and the injured. 
Part II then reviews the empirical support for the economists' moral 
hazard model . As the empirical literature suggests, the predictive capacity 
of the model varies according to the degree to which the underlying as­
sumptions are met in the particular circumstances under review. The eco­
nomic model rests on firmer ground for some phenomena lumped under the 
label "moral hazard" than it does for others lumped under that label . The 
empirical literature confirms, for example, the common sense prediction 
that the existence of insurance will have a greater effect on what people do 
to recover from loss than what they do to prevent loss.16 Thus, having 
health insurance may not make us more sick,17 but it may well mean that 
we go to the doctor more oftenY 
Part II concludes by examining why the rhetorical valence implicit in 
the name "moral hazard" can be troubling even in circumstances in which 
we might agree that insurance changes behavior. What, after all, is wrong 
with enabling people to go to the doctor when they feel the need, and why 
should we be concerned when they do so? The economics of moral hazard 
can tell us only that providing insurance for medical expenses, or time off 
from work to recover from injury (or any other activity), may increase the 
frequency of these activities in the absence of countervailing forces . The 
to relevant literature, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 17-18 (1990); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 213-25 (1995); and Robert C .  Ellickson, Bringing Culture 
and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 23 (1989). For a decidedly unsympathetic perspective, see PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic J . D .  
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION T O  REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 125, 126, 124-26 (1992) (describing the 
rational action theory as "anthropologically false" and "absurd"). 
15. See infra subpart ll(C) . 
16. See infra subpart II(D) . 
17. But see IVAN lLLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 1 1  (1975) (arguing 
that "[t]he medical establishment has become a major threat to health"). 
18. See Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence 
From a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 251, 258-59 (1987) (concluding that people are 
more likely to use medical services when their out-of-pocket expenditures for such services are lower). 
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economics cannot tell us whether countervailing forces exist or, in many 
cases , whether increased consumption of medical or other services is a 
good or bad thing. That is because the economics of moral hazard ignore 
the larger social benefits of insurance, what economists would call 
"positive externalities . "19 
Moreover, even if we agree with the economists that insurance creates 
an incentive to increase the consumption of health care or paid time off 
from work, that does not necessarily mean that we should reduce the bene­
fits provided through health plans, workers' compensation, products liabil­
ity, or other forms of insurance. Other ways to address this "moral 
hazard" exist which are hidden by the assumption that individuals have 
control over their situations . Institutions, for example, can and do affect 
what we do to recover from injury or sickness, as the wave of "managed 
care" sweeping across American health care demonstrates .20 Indeed, as 
research by the sociologist Carol Heimer and others has shown, much of 
insurance practice can be understood as an effort to manage and control 
insurance incentives . 21 
What all this means is that "the lesson of moral hazard" does not 
provide a neutral, technical basis for reforming tort law, workers' compen­
sation, health insurance, or social welfare programs. On purely technical 
grounds ,  the economics of moral hazard are incomplete because by assum­
ing that individuals are in control of their situations , the economics ignore 
institutional control over what people do to prevent or minimize the cost 
of loss . 22 Moreover, even if the economics were not incomplete in that 
sense, they still could not tell us whether the behavior they predict is 
harmful, beneficial , or simply inconsequential in l ight of other values 
promoted or benefits provided by the legal rule or policy choice in 
question. 
As applied, the economics of moral hazard have systematically under­
valued efforts to protect the injured, the sick, and the poor. Further, by 
encouraging us to assume that the injured, the sick, and the poor are in 
control of themselves and their situation, the economics of moral hazard 
19. See infra section II(D)(3). 
20. For an early account of how prepaid health plans reduced the cost of health care by controlling 
patient choice and physician discretion and by substituting nurses and physicians' assistants for 
physicians, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 383 (1982). 
See also infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. 
21. See HEIMER, supra note 13, at 11-17 (incorporating the notion of incentives in a description 
of four general principles governing insurance practices); see also infra note 206. 
22. Coase and North have made similar, more general criticisms of neoclassical economics 
generally. SeeR. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 5 (1988) ( positing that modern 
economic theory has neglected to make institutional entities themselves the subject of investigation and 
analysis) ; NORTH, supra note 14, at 20 (suggesting that a rational choice model of human behavior in 
an institutional context cannot account for the complexity of human decisionmaking) . 
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have helped to absolve the rest of us of our responsibility for that situation. 
In this manner, the economics of moral hazard work to convince us that, 
however well intentioned, social responsibility i s  a bad thing. This 
"eventual uti lity" of the concept of moral hazard represents quite a change 
from the nineteenth century, when the moralizing in  moral hazard helped 
to establish two cruci ally important forms of social responsibility- fire and 
life insurance-as very good things . 
I .  Origins 
The beginning point of any genealogy i s  necessarily an arbitrary one. 
This genealogy will  begin with the origins of the word "hazard, "  which 
was an important insurance word long before it was paired with the word 
"moral . "  After describing the place of "hazard" in the insurance trade, I 
will  describe when and how the pairing of "moral" and "hazard" took 
place, what it was that the resulting "moral hazard" was understood to 
mean, and what may have been the "utility" of that concept within the in­
surance trade. From there, I will race through the twentieth century to the 
1 960s when Nobel prize winning economist Kenneth Arrow imported the 
insurance concept of moral hazard into neoclassical economic theory. 
A. Hazard 
The early meanings of the word "hazard" only infrequently are re­
membered. Today we think mainly of physical danger-safety hazards , 
product hazards, hazardous waste. The word's  origins, however, point to 
danger of a moral kind, or at least to something that Victorians (and quite 
a few people today) would regard as morally hazardous : gambling. The 
Oxford English Dictionary reports that the English "hazard" entered Old 
English from the Old French "hasard" or "hasart" following the Norman 
conquest. 23 At that time, "hasard" or "hasart" (later, "hazard") was the 
name given to "a game at dice in  which the chances are complicated by a 
number of arbitrary rules . "24 
As late as the mid-nineteenth century, the dice game Hazard was a 
staple in  both England and the United States .25 An 1 860 edition of The 
Handbook of Games declared, "Hazard i s  and has been longer, we may 
say, a standing game at all the houses of play in  Great Britain.  "26 Since 
23 . 7 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 3 1-32 (2d ed . 1 989) [hereinafter OED) . 
24. Id. The OED reports that the word and the game originated in Arabic and that " [a]ccording 
to William of Tyre, the game took its name from a castle called Hasart or .Asart in Palestine, during 
the siege of which it was invented . "  Id. at 3 1 .  
25. HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER'S PROGRESS: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA 
FROM THE COLONIES TO CANFIELD 45 (1938) . 
26. THE HAND-BOOK OF GAMES 352 ( Heruy G. Bohn ed. ,  1 860). 
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then, the complicated hazard has been overtaken by a simple version of the 
game-craps27-that is still enormously popular today. 
The QED's earliest English sources use the word "hazard" to refer to 
the dice game, and "hazarder" as someone who plays it.28 S ixteenth­
century sources mark a significant transition in the use of the word: from 
the name of a game, to a metaphor using the game, to a synonym for the 
"chance" that pervades the game. For example, at the conclusion of 
Richard Ill, King Richard cries : 
I have set my life upon a cast, 
And I will stand the hazard of the die. 
I think there be six Richmonds in the field; 
Five have I slain to-day, instead of him. 
A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!29 
27. According to a mid-nineteenth century American source, "craps" was first popularized in 
America in New Orleans in the early nineteenth century. See J.H. GREEN, AN ExPoSURE OF THE ARTS 
AND MISERIES OF GAMBLING 88-89 (1 843) . The game "craps" takes its name from the term "crap" 
referring to dice combinations which, when thrown, cause the caster to lose the tum at the dice (and 
the money staked). See R.F. FOSTER, FOSTER'S COMPLETE HOYLE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAMES 
578 (1963). In Hazard, these same throws were called "crabs."  The most concise description of the 
game of Hazard comes from THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA: 
The instruments are a box and two dice. The players are a caster and any number 
of setters . The setter stakes his money upon the table; the caster accepts the bet if he 
chooses, and must cover the setter's money if required . The setter can bar any throw. 
The caster first calls a main-that is, he calls any of the numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9. He 
then throws his chance. If this is 2, 3 ,  1 1 ,  or 12, it is called crabs and he loses, unless 
the main were 7 and he throws 1 1 ,  or the main were 6 or 8 and he throws 12.  In these 
cases, and also if he throws the main, his throw is called nick, and he wins. If he throws 
neither crabs nor nick, he must continue to throw until he again throws the main [i.e., the 
number he called] or his chance [i.e., the first combination he threw] ; if he throws the 
former first, the setter wins, if the latter the caster wins. Owing to the complicated 
chances, a good player at hazard has a great advantage over a novice. 
4 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA 2745 (William Dwight Whitney ed., 1 897) .  In 
French gaming houses, the British "crabs" became "craps," and that name stuck in French-speaking 
New Orleans, where new, simpler rules made the game accessible to those who might have been 
daunted by Hazard's complexity. ASBURY, supra note 25, at 40-48. An alternative explanation of the 
origin of the name "craps" appears in EDWARD LAROCQUE TINKER, CREOLE CITY: ITS PAST AND ITS 
PEOPLE 8 (1953). 
28. For example, Chaucer's Pardoner's Tale reports: 
Hasard is verray mooder of lesynges . . . 
It is rep reeve and contrarie of honour 
For to ben holde a commune hasardour. 
GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Pardoner's Tale, in THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER 196, 198 at VI. 591 ,  595-96 
(Larry D. Benson ed., 3d ed. 1 987) . E. Benson Perkins provides the following modernization of 
Chaucer's verse: 
Gaming is the very mother of all lies . . . .  
'Tis shameful and repugnant to honour 
To be regarded as a hazarder. 
E. BENSON PERKINS, GAMBLING IN ENGLISH LIFE 9 (1958) .  
29. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD THE THIRD act 5 ,  sc. 4, lines 9-13  
(G. Blakemore Evans ed., Penguin Books 1 969) . 
246 Texas Law Review [Vol . 75:237 
Here is the game of hazard as an intricate metaphor in which Richard 
stakes his life against the crown. Five times that day the die had been cast, 
and every side but the one he needed had come up : five false 
Richmonds,30 and not the true one. Now, like a true gambler, Richard 
wanted one last cast, to stake all that he still had-his kingdom-against 
nothing more (or less) than the lowly horse he needed to hazard the king­
dom again. 
Thus, from "hazard ,"  a dangerous game of chance, comes "hazard" 
as chance. When Samuel Johnson prepared his dictionary in the late eigh­
teenth century, the primary definition he gave for hazard was just that: 
"Chance; accident; fortuitous happening. "31 "Chance" was strongly im­
plicated in his remaining definitions as well : "Danger; chance of danger, " 
and, of course, "a game at dice, " which is to say, a game of chance.32 
While not the primary sense of "hazard" today, chance remains a central 
element in the congeries of meanings that make up the word and distin­
guish "hazard" from its close cousins "risk" and "peril . "33 
B. Insurance Hazards and the Doctrine of Chances 
To the nineteenth-century ear, the word "hazard" openly carried its 
dicing origins, and insurance writing from the period is full of plays on the 
word "hazard. "34 Within insurance literature, the word also carried the 
close connection between the game of Hazard and the "doctrine of 
chances . "35 In the late seventeenth century, wealthy gamblers had com­
missioned mathematicians such as Pascal and Galileo to calculate the com­
pi icated odds of Hazard. The calculations ripened into Pascal's theory of 
probability, and from there into the doctrine of chances , the intellectual 
cornerstone of the nineteenth -century insurance enterprise. 36 
30. The notes to the Penguin edition of RicHARD ill for lines 9 to 13 report that dressing and 
arming other men to look like a leader was "a common safety measure." /d. at 176. 
31. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (facsimile ed . 1990) (1755). 
32. /d. 
33. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 830, 1346, 1557 (3d 
ed . 1992) (defining hazard, risk, and peril) . In French, chance remains the primary meaning of 
"hasard. "  See 1 HARRAP'S NEW STANDARD FRENCH & ENGLISH DICTIONARY H:5 (Rene P.L.  
Ledesert & Margaret Ledesert eds . ,  rev.  ed. 1972). 
34. See, e.g. , CHARLES HARDWICK, THE HISTORY, PREsENT POSITION, AND SOCIAL IMPORTANCE 
OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES 133 (1859) ("Mr. Finlaison's small society won in the hazard.") . 
35. See M.A. QUETELET, LETTERS ON THE THEORY OF PROBABILITIES 30 (1849) (discussing the 
doctrine of chances with regard to games of chance and annuities). 
36. See 2 CORNELIUS WALFORD, THE INSURANCE CYCLOPEDIA 179-80 (1873) (stating in the entry 
under Chevalier de Mere that de Mere's request to Pascal to solve probability problems related to dice 
led to the development of the doctrine of chances); see also IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF 
PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE 57-62 (1975) (describing the interactions between de Mere and Pascal which 
led to the emergence of the theory of probability) . 
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In the early nineteenth century, Adolphe Quetelet and other "moral 
scientists" applied probability theory to vital statistics like births, mar­
riages , and suicides and thereby proved the great intuition of marine insur­
ance: The risks of uncertain future events could, like the odds of Hazard, 
be predicted in the aggregate with sufficient certainty to enable the accurate 
collection of money today for the costs of tomorrow.37 Insurance men, 
the entrepreneur prophets of this "doctrine of chances, "  set out to make 
their fortunes by protecting whole populations against the terrors of 
chance.38 
There seemed to be no boundaries beyond which the insurance enter­
prise could not, in time, extend. As the moral scientists had taught, the 
doctrine of chances meant that through "persevering observation, " the past 
could predict the future "of moral as well as of physical phenomena, of 
those which seem to be the result of the freest volition. "39 Indeed, even 
"the individual instances where trust is broken, and moral restraint gives 
way before the impulses of cupidity or the cravings of want, are susceptible 
of computation of a very nice average. " 40  
Thus, like the game of Hazard, life was viewed as a complicated game 
of chance, decipherable in the aggregate, and insurance was the practical 
science that would reorganize society around this new principle:  
Insurance, therefore, takes from all a contribution; from those who 
will not need its aid, as well as from those who will; for it is as 
certain that some will not, as that some will. But as it is uncertain 
who will, and who will not, it demands this tribute from all to the 
37. There is a very rich recent literature on the history of statistics. See, e.g. , HAcKING, supra 
note 36; IAN H ACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE (1990) . Other significant works in the field include 
MICHAEL J. CULLEN, THE STATISTICAL MOVEMENT IN EARLY VICTORIAN BRIT AJN (1975); LoRRAINE 
DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1988); DONALD A. MACKENZIE & 
THEODORE M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING 1 820-1900 (1986); THE PR.OBABALISTIC 
REVOLUTION ( Lorenz Kruger et a! .  eds. ,  1987); Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives : Life 
Insurance in English Society and Culture, 1 695-1 775 (1 993) (unpublished Ph .D. dissertation, Princeton 
University) (available through UMI Dissertation Information Service) . 
3 8 .  The conscious, contemporary link between insurance and the doctrine of chances is made clear 
in the following excerpt from an article appearing in a widely distributed mid-nineteenth century 
commercial journal:  
All  insurance, whatever its kind, or the basis on which it is  practised , whether on 
the mutual or stock plan, whether on houses, ships, or lives, rests on the same law-the 
law of average. This law is the result of a science peculiar to modem times-the doctrine 
of chances. Modem observation has succeeded, it is believed, in detecting in the midst 
of the individual irregularity of those events in life which we call accidents, a prevailing 
general regularity running through and pervading them. 
D.R. Jacques, Society on the Basis of Mutual Life Insurance, 16 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 152, 1 53 
(1849) . 
39 .  Horace Binney, Address (1850), in J.A. FOWLER, HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN PHILADELPHIA 
393 (1 888). 
40 .  Principles ofLife Assurance, LoNDON DAJLY NEWS, reprinted in 5 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. 
REG. 642, 644 (J. Smith Romans ed . ,  1 853) . 
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uncertainty of fate. . . . From this point of view the whole beauty 
of the system of insurance is seen. It is from this point of view that 
it presents society a union for mutual aid, of the fortunate and 
unfortunate, where those only who need it receive aid, and those 
only who can afford it are put to expense. Thus ,  while the aggregate 
of human suffering and calamity remains undiminished-thus ,  while 
the uncertainty of their visitation remains unremoved-human 
ingenuity and cooperation equalize the distribution of this fearful 
aggregate, and alleviate the terrors of uncertainty. 41 
"Moral hazard" resonates with this moment: "hazard, " with its overtones 
of chance, danger, and high stakes dice games; and "moral, "  from the 
"moral scientists" who made chaste use of the odds learned from gambling 
and introduced the doctrine of chances to the insurance world.42 What 
combination of words could better signify the serious, scientific, and highly 
proper-indeed "moral"43-grounding of the insurance enterprise? 
Fire insurers had long distinguished among physical "hazards, "  in two 
senses of that word. There were hazards that caused fires (for example, 
l ightning, short circuits, spontaneous combustion), and there were hazards 
that affected the probability or magnitude of loss by fire (for example, the 
type of construction or use of a building) . In the mid-nineteenth century, 
fire insurers , and, later, life and other insurers , began using the adjective 
"moral" to modify both of these senses of "hazard. "44 "Incendiarism, " 
4 1 .  Jacques, supra note 38,  at 158 .  
42. See HACKING, supra note 36, at  99-101 (detailing the application of the doctrine of chances 
to life annuity rates in the late seventeenth century) . It is revealing to note that the translator of the 
first English translation of Quetelet' s  LETrERS ON THE THEORY OF PROBABILITIES, published in 1 849, 
identified himself as a member of the Economic Life Assurance Society in London. See QUETELET, 
supra note 35,  at title page. 
43 . According to the OED, both the noun and adjective "moral" come from the Latin mor-, mos, 
meaning custom. 9 OED, supra note 23 , at 1068 . The OED gives the first (and still primary) meaning 
of the adjective "moral" as: 
Of or pertaining to character or disposition, considered as good or bad, virtuous or 
vicious; of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in 
relation to actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings; ethical. 
Id. Although this definition may be problematic from a philosophical perspective, it is more than 
adequate for present purposes. Regardless of the equivalence or lack of equivalence of "morals" and 
"ethics" ; or the differences among "good and bad, "  "right and wrong,"  and "good and evil" as funda­
mental opposites; or the relationship between "action, "  "volition," and "character"; there is no doubt 
that the word "moral" still has tremendous normative punch. What is understood to be "moral" varies 
with time and place, but not the normative valence of the term. "Moral" is positive-good, right, true. 
"Not moral" ("immoral" or "amoral" or any of the many substitutes for those words) is negative-bad, 
wrong, false, evil .  Anyone who doubts whether this valence survived Nietzsche's problematizing of 
the "moral" or the Freudian account of the attractions of the "immoral" need only recall the charges 
and countercharges that followed Reverend Jerry Falwell's adoption of the name "Moral Majority" for 
his political organization in the 1980s. See People, TIME, Oct. 17,  1 983,  at 63 , 63 (quoting Sen. Ted 
Kennedy for the proposition that " [t]he controversy about the Moral Majority arises not only from its 
views, but from its name") . 
44. The earliest "moral hazard" usage I have found appears in an American fire insurance guide 
first published in 1 862. See ARTHUR C. DUCAT, THE PRACTICE OF FIRE UNDERWRITING 164-65 (4th 
1996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 249 
fraud, and " interested carelessness" were moral hazards that caused 
losses .45 Bad character or habits, financial embarrassment, poor business 
practices, and overinsurance were moral hazards that increased the proba­
bility of loss .46 
The moral ideal embodied in both senses of the new term could have 
come straight from a Victorian novel . The "moral" insured was honest, 
careful, chaste, thrifty, hard working, moderate in habits, and (more on 
this later) did not gamble: in other words, a Colonel William Dobbin, the 
moral exemplar of Thackeray's Vanity Fair,41 or a Stephen Blackpool, 
from Dickens's Hard Tzmes.48 
To be sure, the concerns encompassed within "moral hazard" did not 
originate with that term. Insurance trade literature from the early 
nineteenth century, for example, contains discussions of the "personal 
element" of the insurance risk;49 and marine insurance sources from well 
before then emphasize the materiality of the "character" of those involved 
with the insured risk.50 Once the new name was coined, however, it 
stuck. Moral hazard quickly became one of the fundamental concerns of 
the insurance trade and, eventually, the name given to one of the big ideas 
of neoclassical economics . 
ed . 1 865) (defining moral hazard as " [t]he danger proceeding from motives to destroy property by fire, 
or permit its destruction"). Guarantee insurers, the forerunners of today's  surety and bonding 
institutions, described what they began doing in the 1 840s in England as insuring "risk of a moral as 
well as a mathematical character,"  but they do not appear to have coined the term "moral hazard. "  
See Guarantee Insurance, LoNDON BANKERS MAG. ,  reprinted in 5 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. REG. 89 
(I. Smith Homans ed . ,  1 853) (examining insurance protection against the dishonesty of employees, but 
not using the term "moral hazard"). Fire insurance trade literature from the 1 840s contains discussions 
of both the "personal element" of hazard and the "character" of insureds. See, e.g . , George W .  
Savage, Origin and Nature of Fire Insurance, 4 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 159,  239 (1842) (arguing 
that an insured's lack of effort to prevent or abate loss from fire is "presumptive proof" of criminal 
or fraudulent intent) . Had the term "moral hazard" been widely used that early, it is likely that at least 
some of the literature I have reviewed would have contained the term. See, e.g. , A City Insurance 
Company, NEW ORLEANS COM. BULL. ,  reprinted in 4 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. REG. 1005, 1006 (J .  
Smith Homans ed . ,  1850) (raising concerns that would later be called "moral hazards" without using 
that term) . An 1 855 article in the New York Insurance Reporter urged (as if it were a new idea) " [t]hat 
term 'hazardous' which is sometimes applied to buildings, and for which three or four per cent 
premium is charged, should also apply to the character [of the insured] . "  Frauds in Fire Insurance, 
NEW YoRK INs. REP. ,  reprinted in 32 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 365 (1855) . 
45 . See DUCAT, supra note 44, at 9, 165 .  
46 .  See id. at  12-15 (listing several situations in  which insurers should be cautious); D.S .  
FLETCHER, THE NATIONAL LIFE ASSOCIATION O F  HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, MANUAL F O R  THE USE 
OF AGENTS 19  (1895) (listing "good habits" as a prerequisite for life insurance) . 
47 . WILLIAM THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR (J.I.M. Stewart ed. ,  Penguin Books 1 968) (1848) . 
48 . CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (George Ford & Sylvere Monod eds. ,  W.W. Norton & Co. 
1966) (1854). 
49. See, e.g. , Savage, supra note 44, at 244 (underlining the importance of "ascertaining the 
character and circumstances of the insured") . 
50. See SAMUEL MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 221 (1805) ("The name 
of the master, also should be specified; because his character and ability are material subjects of 
consideration in estimating the risk.").  
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C. Moral Hazard: Character and Temptation 
Just what makes up the insurance moral hazard? For nineteenth­
century insurers , moral hazard was a label applied both to people and situa­
tions . The people were those whose character suggested that they were un­
usually susceptible to the temptation that insurance can create, and the situ­
ations were those that heightened that temptation. The 1 867 edition of the 
Aetna Guide to Fire Insurance illustrates both these senses of moral hazard 
and the relationship between the two.51 
The Guide begins its description of the underwriting process by ad­
monishing agents to " [c]onsider first the moral hazard. "52 The Guide 
then asks : 
What is the general character borne by the applicant? Are his habits 
good? Is he an old resident, or a stranger and an itinerant? Is he 
effecting insurance hastily, or for the first time? Have threats been 
uttered against him? Is he peaceable or quarrelsome-popular or 
disliked? Is his business profitable or otherwise? Has he been trying 
to sell out? Is he pecuniarily embarrassed? Is the stock reasonably 
fresh and new, or old, shopworn, and unsalable? When was an 
inventory last taken? Is the amount of insurance asked for, fully 
justified by the amount and value of the stock? Is a set of books 
systematically kept?53 
Character, or the individual predisposition for fraud or loss, is a dominant 
concern here. It is the job of, first, the agent, and then the underwriter to 
weed out "moral hazards" -those insureds most likely to be careless or 
fraudulent. 54 
The Aetna Guide also stressed, however, that there were certain situa­
tions which posed a moral hazard for all insureds, regardless of individual 
predisposition: 
[T]he insured should never make money by a loss. The contract 
should never be so arranged, that under any circumstances it would 
be profitable to the insured to meet with disaster. Any other 
arrangement is offering a premium for carelessness and roguery. 55 
51 . AETNA GUIDE TO FIRE INSURANCE FOR THE .REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AETNA INSURANCE 
C o .  (1867) [hereinafter AETNA GUIDE]. 
52. ld. at 21. 
53 . Id. (emphasis added) . 
54. Cf SAMUELR. WEED, HANDBOOK FOR FIRE INSURANCE AGENTS 21 (2d ed . 1904) ("Let the 
question of moral hazard constantly oppress you . You cannot be too much concerned over the honesty 
and integrity of applicants for insurance. "). 
55. AETNA GUIDE, supra note 51, at 1 57 (emphasis in original) . One fire agents' manual stated : 
"where there is no valued interest unprotected , people are not always as careful in protecting property 
as they naturally would be if a portion of the risk was being carried by themselves ." H . S .  TIFFANY, 
TIFFANY'S INSTRUCTION BOOK FOR FIRE INSURANCE AGENTS 46 ( lOth ed. 1882). 
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Even in this description, there is a strong reference to character­
"carelessness and roguery. " The good insured, like the good person, was 
neither careless nor a rogue. But, because carelessness and roguery, l ike 
all sins, are potentially present in even good people, 56 insurance must be 
structured so as not to "lead us into temptation . "  Thus, the insurance 
"moral hazard" is not only the "immoral" person, but also a characteristic 
of the insurance relationship itself. 
The focus on temptation is even more explicit in the Aetna Guide's 
warning about overinsurance: Heavy insurance also increases the moral 
hazard, by developing a motive for crime, where otherwise no temptation 
existed , and wrong was in no way contemplated. 57 This link reveals an 
important point: Even the "incentive" aspect of moral hazard was under­
stood in moralistic terms . The classic situation in which insurance most 
changes incentives-overinsurance-works through temptation, by bringing 
out the bad in otherwise good people. 
The conventional account of the insurance view distinguishes between 
the character of those involved in the risk and the incentive created by 
insurance. 58 The concept of insurance as incentive, however, reflects the 
rational choice framework of those who use it and obscures the overriding­
ly moralistic nature of the nineteenth-century insurer's moral hazard. As 
the Aetna Guide illustrates , moral hazard in the insurance context derives 
from the interrelated dynamics of character and temptation-the worse the 
insured's character, the less temptation needed to provoke her to cheat the 
insurance company, and the more likely she is to seek out a situation in 
which the temptation is present. As insurance manuals would have put it, 
there is no premium high enough for a building under the care of an arson­
ist, 59 and, when the best price that can be obtained for a building is from 
the insurance company, even an honest person "would not be angered by 
56.  Cf WALTER E. HOUGHTON, THE VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND 1 830-1870, at 236 (1957) .  
Houghton writes: 
I d. 
Only by realizing what a desperate struggle the moral life entailed, both to resist 
temptation and to train the will, can we do justice to the Victorian taboos, so often and 
so easily ridiculed: the prohibition of dancing, cards and the theater . . . .  For when the 
standard of interior character was so high and the best approximation to it so precariously 
poised, anything that was not patently innocent or didactic might at the least distract the 
mind from God and fasten the heart more securely to the world, or at the worst corrupt 
the world irredeemably. 
57. AETNA GUIDE, supra note 5 1 ,  at 159;  see also DUCAT, supra note 44, at 1 1-12 (explaining 
how insurance can offer "a direct incentive to crime") . 
58. The leading historical and institutional analysis of the problem of moral hazard is HEIMER, 
supra note 13 . Heimer describes the insurer's view of moral hazard as a combination of "character" 
and "economic rationality" or "incentive. "  ld. at 35-37.  
59. See DUCAT, supra note 44, at  1 1 -12.  
-----··  
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the discovery that it had been burned. "60 An insured meeting an under­
writer's moral ideal would not yield even in the face of the strongest temp­
tation. But this ideal is impossibly high and, therefore, character under­
writing, alone, is not enough. Insurers must work to reduce the temptation 
insurance can create. The moral ideal, still Vanity Fair's Colonel William 
Dobbin, is the exception that proves this rule.  61 
D. Moral Hazard and the Morality of Insurance 
If there were regular, observable patterns "of moral as well as of 
physical phenomena, "62 and if insurance was to become the practical ap­
plication of this doctrine of chances, then why resist collecting premiums 
from, and paying losses caused by, people who ran afoul of the underwrit­
er's or adjuster's moral hazard ranking? After all ,  if suicides, weddings , 
and crime observed the regularities of dice games, why not carelessness? 
Insuring people thought more l ikely to be careless (or even arsonists or 
thieves) may, in effect, load the dice, but that simply changes the odds, not 
the fact that the dice will produce predictable results over the long run. 
All that is required to keep the game afloat is the collection of a higher 
premium from the morally hazardous .  
Understanding this point depends on the recognition that no insurer 
can identify with perfect accuracy those people who will cause a fire 
(whether intentionally or through carelessness) . At best, the insurer can 
identify those who are more l ikely to do so. The fact that insuring these 
"moral hazards" may increase the chance that they will cause such a fire, 
does not eliminate chance from the equation, it simply increases the premi­
ums that must be charged to pay the claims . As long as premiums reflect 
60. WEED, supra note 54, at 21 . 
6 1 .  Near the conclusion of Vanity Fair, Colonel Dobbin's wife learns that her brother had taken 
out a life insurance policy on himself, and " in a good deal of alarm" assumed that her brother was 
financially embarrassed (apparently because a gentleman was thought to have no need for life insurance 
unless his creditors demanded it) . THACKERAY, supra note 47, at 794. She immediately dispatched 
Dobbin to see her brother, who explained that he had taken the insurance policy out to provide a "little 
present" for his disreputable companion, Lady Rebecca Crawley, the former Becky Sharp (to whom 
he certainly could not leave anything in his will). Id. at 794-95. Dobbin counseled his brother-in-law 
that Rebecca was capable of killing for the money and warned him to break off the relationship . 
When the brother-in-law died three months later, it turned out that the life insurance p roceeds 
were payable half to Rebecca and half to Dobbin's wife. The Insurance Office at first refused to pay 
Rebecca-" [t]he solicitor of the Insurance Company swore it was the blackest case that ever had come 
before him"-id. at 796, but relented under pressure from Rebecca's solicitors, Messrs. Burke, 
Thurtell ,  and Hayes (names that, according to the notes to the Penguin English Library edition, the 
nineteenth century reader would have known as notorious murderers) . I d. at 813  n.7.  Colonel Dobbin, 
however, was made of much finer stuff. Thackeray reports that he "sent back his share of the legacy 
to the Insurance Office, and rigidly declined to hold any communication with Rebecca . "  Id. at 796. 
62. Binney, supra note 39, at 393 . 
1996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 253 
the risk of the subpopulations insured, a decision to insure the morally 
hazardous does not mean that insurance premiums will rise for everyone. 
Despite the similarity between moral and physical hazards, nineteenth­
century insurers treated moral and physical hazards in one remarkably dif­
ferent way. Except in the extreme case, the answer to most physical haz­
ards was a higher premium rate, not a refusal to insure. 63 Finding the 
premium that would adequately reflect that hazard required experimenta­
tion, which sometimes ended in failure and an ultimate refusal to insure.64 
Refusal to insure, however, was a last resort. 
With moral hazard, in contrast, refusal to insure was the first resort. 
Unlike the appl icant who presented a greater-than-usual physical hazard, 
the applicant who presented a greater-than-usual moral hazard could not 
obtain insurance at a higher price. 65 There appears, in other words, to 
have been no experimentation in l ife and fire insurance with moral hazard 
based premium classes , notwithstanding extensive attention in the trade 
literature to moral hazard characteristics . While it is undoubtedly true that 
the physical hazard of a risk was more readily observable than the moral 
hazard, this alone cannot explain the lack of experimentation. Moral haz­
ard was regarded as sufficiently observable to form the basis for a refusal 
to insure, and a premium surcharge could not have been insurmountably 
more difficult to administer.66 Yet, as the Aetna Guide illustrates , 
63 . For example, in a town that contained largely brick dwellings, a wooden structure would not 
be rejected on the basis of physical hazard, but rather assessed a larger p remium based on some sense 
of the relative risks posed by wood as compared to brick. Compare DUCAT, supra note 44, at 78 
(describing wood-frame building rates) , with id. at 63-64 (describing brick building rates) . Similarly, 
a life insurance applicant with a medical history could, to a point, obtain insurance, just at a higher 
price. See, e.g. , FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 10 .  Under the hazard-based premium-rating principles, 
insureds classed as presenting low physical hazards were shielded from the claims of those classed as 
presenting a greater physical hazard, but only those classed as the most hazardous were shut out of the 
insurance club altogether. 
64 . See F. HARCOURT KITCHIN, THE PRINCIPLES AND FINANCE OF FIRE INSURANCE 1 (1904) 
("The science of fire insurance is a purely experimental one . ") ;  ROBERT RIEGEL, FIRE UNDERWRITERS' 
ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 38-43 ( 1916) (describing reports by fire underwriters admitting 
that fire insurance rates were "guesses" not based on " statistics" ) .  
65. See DUCAT, supra note 44, a t  12-15 (stating that agents should "reject" applicants with various 
characteristics, unless the agent was "well satisfied" that the applicant was "worthy of your 
confidence") ;  TIFFANY, supra note 55, at 24 ("If the moral hazard is not good, there are no 
considerations that would induce a company to accept the risk . . . .  "); AETNA GUIDE, supra note 5 1 ,  
at 13  ("Moral Hazard-The character of the applicant i s  usually of the first importance; and where this 
is not satisfactory, the application should be dismissed at once.");  MANUAL FOR SUPERINTENDENTS 
AND ASSISTANT S UPERINTENDENTS OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 
at Form 1 ,  1 8 (1889) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN MANUAL] (listing as uninsurable "those who have 
been of intemperate habits" and "persons of ill-fame") .  
66. The New York Insurance Reporter urged just such a system i n  1855. See Frauds in Fire 
Insurance, supra note 44, at 365 ("By a rigid inquiry into the character of every applicant for 
insurance, and by graduating the amount of p remium accordingly, the burden would be mainly borne 
by those who ought to bear it. ").  
) . i  
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msurance companies' avowed goal was to avoid moral hazard-not to 
underwrite, rate, control ,  or otherwise manage it. 
This resistance to insuring moral hazards l ies in great tension with the 
apparent faith in the moral scientists' doctrine of chances . Not all of life, 
it seems, was to be ceded to the field of Hazard. What remained to be left 
outside was the realm of evil : crime, fraud, and the suspicious "other. " 
Thus , nineteenth-century l ife and fire insurers l imited the insurance of mor­
al hazards, not because of complexity or for other technical reasons, but 
because of ideas about right and wrong, as the term "moral hazard" sug­
gests . Insurance was a moral enterprise "deeply interested in the growth 
of public and private honor, " and insurance men had a duty to " [g]uard[] 
against moral hazard from without" and "against moral perversion from 
within. "67 Everyone involved in the enterprise, both insurer and insured, 
had an obligation to exclude the immoral . 68 
While at least some of the insurance men believed that they could in­
sure moral hazards (as long as the rates were adequate) , those who did so 
came under attack. 69 Refusing to insure moral hazards affirmed the mo­
rality of insurance at a time when building the small ,  largely commercial 
insurance business into a mass consumer enterprise required assuaging 
widespread moral concerns . As Viviana Zelizer has documented in her 
study of nineteenth-century life insurance, assuaging these concerns was no 
67. Thomas S .  Chard, Morals and Moral Hazard as Related to Underwriting, Address Before the 
Fire Underwriters' Association of the Northwest (Sept. 22, 1 875), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FIRE UNDERWRITERS' ASS'N OF THE NORTHWEST 28, 32 ( 1875) . 
68 . The responsibility to guard against immorality was not limited to insurance companies; it also 
extended to insureds, who were urged to report "swindlers" because 
[t]he rates of premium charged by insurers, are governed by the amount of losses. Thus 
the honest man is made to contribute for the acts of the swindler, by paying the higher 
rate of premium, which goes indirectly into the coffers of those who live by these frauds, 
to the great injury of the innocent. 
James Bergen, Fraud Upon Underwriters, 2 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. & COM . REv. 296, 297 
(1840) . 
69 . Fire insurers, for example, were criticized for covertly insuring moral hazards. See Condition 
of the Fire Insurance Interest, 56 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. & COM. REV. 204 (1 867) (reporting 
on a fire insurance convention in which insurers agreed to raise rates because of heavy losses, 
assertedly due to arson, in the past two years) . The objection raised in the trade press was not an 
adverse selection argument of the sort we might expect today, but rather the unfairness of "taxing" the 
honest for the misdeeds of the dishonest: "The public have a right to expect of the insurance companies 
that they exercise a most searching scrutiny into the degree of risk arising from this cause, so that they 
be not needlessly taxed, by an increase of premiums, to cover the destruction caused by incendiaries. 
The true remedy in this case is in prevention, rather than an increase of rates ." ld. at 205; see also 
ALEXANDER COLIN CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRIME 136  (1902) ("At least two generations of men 
have been engaged in making compacts and agreements among companies to increase rates and 
maintain them at a point at which the moral hazard could safely be left in a secondary place in the 
calculation.") .  For support for the claim that fire insurers were able to control rates, see BARRY 
SUPPLE, THE ROYAL ExCHANGE ASSURANCE: A HISTORY OF BRITISH INSURANCE, 1 720-1 970, at 282 
(1970) (reporting the " relative success" of British fire insurers in controlling rates in the mid to late 
nineteenth century) . 
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easy task.70 The mid-nineteenth century witnessed a cultural struggle over 
the morality of the insurance enterprise in which insurance was attacked as 
a form of gambling, a handmaiden to crime, and, above all ,  a presumptu­
ous interference with Divine Providence. The insurer's moral hazard both 
reflected these concerns and responded to them. 
1 .  Providence . -The claim that insurance interfered with Providence 
was largely used to attack life insurance.71 Nevertheless, it has a broader 
cultural resonance that is reflected in, for example, Melville's The 
Lightning-Rod Man.72 Melville's lightning rod salesman was Lucifer him­
self, who appeared in a storm to tempt the narrator into paying for protec­
tion against God's thunder bolts .73 The story reveals a perspective from 
which insurance itself can be seen as a moral hazard-a sinful effort to 
ward off the earthly means through which God's plan is executed . 
Eventually, the objection that insurance interfered with the Divine Plan 
was turned on its head as the insurance men turned calamity into chance 
and linked insurance to the cultural values of self-reliance, thrift, and 
acquisitiveness . While people must rely on Divine Providence, they must 
also "employ[ ] the means by which the Providence of God acts" -that is 
to say, insurance-to take care of their own.74 Indeed, insurance writers 
argued that what was immoral was the failure to exercise the prudence and 
self-restraint required to obtain and pay for insurance, not the reverse.75 
70. See ZELIZER, supra note 9, at 9 1 - 1 17.  
7 1 .  See, e.g. , E.W. Stoughton, Life insurance, 2 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 230, 232 (1 840) 
(reporting the objection but concluding that insuring life is not materially different from insuring prop­
erty because losses generally depend on chance) . For a general discussion of the morality of life insur­
ance, see ZELIZER, supra note 9, at 73-79. 
72 . See HERMAN MEL VJLLE, The Lightning-Rod Man, in PIAZZA TALES 141 (Egbert S .  Oliver ed. ,  
1 962) (1856) . The story was first published i n  1 854. See Egbert S .  Oliver, Explanatory Notes to 
MELVJLLE, supra, at 238 .  
73 . A parallel and contemporaneous vision of lightning rods appears i n  G . H . LEWES, THE LIFE 
OF MAxMILIEN ROBESPIERRE, reprinted in R. BRUCE BICKLEY, JR. ,  THE METHOD OF MELVJLLE'S 
SHORT FICTION 68-69 ( 1975) . Lewes reports that the following charges were lodged against a French 
landowner for erecting a lightning rod: 
[S]hall we rend the lightning from the hand of God? Shall man presume to intercept the 
wrath of the Deity[?] If God wills to destroy houses or farms, it is his will and pleasure­
man's duty is to submit. These lightning conductors are but the impious thoughts of 
Deistical philosophy ! 
For a neoclassical economic discussion of the relationship between lightning rods and insurance, see 
Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 4, at 638 (comparing insurance and protection against loss) . 
74. The Morality of Life Insurance, 22 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. & COM. REv. 1 1 7  ( 1850); 
see also Stoughton, supra note 7 1 ,  at 235 ("Is there any presumption towards his Maker, in thus 
endeavoring to make an event, which must inevitably produce mourning and unhappiness in the hearts 
of his wife and children, fall upon them as lightly as possible?") .  
75 . See MOSES L. KNAPP, LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LIFE INSURANCE 21  ( 1853) ("A Life 
Insurance Company, then, is a brotherhood of provident husbands and fathers, who love their wives 
and children.");  id. at 205-36 (discussing the moral influence of life insurance);  Cook, Life Insurance: 
. I 
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The emphasis on moral hazards reinforced the morality of insurance. 
Because no systematic method for rating moral hazards existed (notwith­
standing the dreams of the moral scientists) , a few rules of thumb together 
with conventional morality- "I know it when I see it" -were the only 
guides underwriters had.76 As a result, the people excluded as moral 
hazards deviated from conventional morality, or, more importantly, were 
regarded as deviant by that conventional morality. 77 In contrast, the 
people permitted to insure were "the very best class of the community. "78 
In the words on one turn-of-the-century advertisement, " [i]nsurance against 
want by preparation for it is . . . the most human, and the most in accord­
ance with the teachings of the Christian religion. "79 In an important 
sense, it did not matter whether the people excluded actually incurred 
greater losses than the people sold insurance (how could anyone possibly 
know?) . Excluding those who deviated from the conventional-whether 
because of religion, birthplace, unpopularity, or manner of making a 
living-signified that insurance was a moral enterprise. 
Its Advantages to the Working Classes, Address before the Mechanics' Institute and Library 
Association of Quebec, in 4 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. REG. 370, 3 8 1  (J . Smith Romans ed . ,  1 849-50) 
("Let not those who neglect this precaution, which prudence and affection, care for the bodily comforts, 
and even for the moral good of their families, should alike prompt them to take, say they cannot. They 
can if they will. "  (emphasis in original)) . 
76.  A.F. Dean, the nineteenth-century author of the influential Analytic System for the 
Measurement of the Relative Fire Hazard, concluded that moral hazard cannot b e  captured by a 
classification list and can only by addressed by "the skill of the company management. "  A.F.  DEAN, 
Classified Experience, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF FIRE INSURANCE 8, 52, 5 1 -53 (W.R. Townley ed . ,  
1925); see also Richard M.  Bissell, Rates and Hazards, in 2 YALE INSURANCE LECI'URES 92 ,  92 
(1903-04) ("Moral hazards are hidden, presumed rather than known, not to be measured or 
scheduled.") .  
77. See DUCAT, supra note 44, at 12-15 (listing as moral hazard markers "bad or dishonest 
character, "  "strangers, "  "embarrassed persons,"  "temporary or itinerant trading," "parties . . .  who 
is [sic) unpopular, " and "careless persons"); see also PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INs. Co. OF CAL . ,  BOOK OF 
RATES, VALUES AND INSTRUCI'IONS 494 (1909) ("The company will not grant a policy to any person 
known to be a gambler . ") ;  cf TIFFANY, supra note 55, at 44 (noting that insurance companies are not 
interested in "Peter Smith, a wild harem-scarem fellow, who is, to say the least, not noted for being 
the most careful and discreet person in the world"). 
78. Benefits of Life Insurance, 53 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. & COM . REV. 3 90 (1865) . 
79 . Advertisement for Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, INs. MONITOR ( HALF­
CENTURY ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 1 853-1903), Dec. 1903 ,  at xviii. As the advertisement suggests, the 
conventional morality reflected in the tum-of-the-century insurance trade had a profoundly anti-semitic 
side. Cj. Responsibility for Fraudulent Jewish Losses, 55 INs. MONITOR 23 ( 1 907 )  ("There are 
honorable Jews as there are honorable Gentiles, but that the evil disposed among the race gravitate to 
incendiarism is a notorious fact, and the underwriters who close their eyes to moral hazard wrong the 
companies and wrong their community.") .  
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2. Gambling. -The objection that insurance was gambling80 is a 
complicated one whose surface can only be skimmed here. The 
"prudential" and "speculative" elements of life insurance were inextricably 
intertwined at the beginning of the insurance industry and remained that 
way well into the nineteenth century. 81 Moreover, it is the received 
wisdom about the history of Lloyds that the speculative element was not 
driven out of marine insurance until the late eighteenth century when a 
group of underwriters quit Ed Lloyds's original coffee house and set up the 
New Lloyds coffee house which forbade gambling.82 Thus, the 
"objection" that insurance was gambling may have been no objection at all ,  
but rather a truism mouthed by those who wished to separate the specula­
tive element of insurance from the prudential element. 83 
Nevertheless, the objection resonated in the moral climate of the time. 
Melville's image of Lucifer peddling lightning rods might have stretched 
popular sentiment, but the image of Lucifer running a dice game did not. 
Association with gambling threatened the legitimacy of insurance, 84 and 
there was a continuing effort, both in the insurance l iterature85 and in the 
80 . See, e.g. , A.B .  Johnson, The Relative Merits of Life Insurance and Savings Banks, 25 HUNT'S 
MERCHANTS' MAG. & COM. REV. 670, 671 (1851) .  Johnson writes : 
/d. 
But gambling lures men from industry, frugality, and accumulation, by hopes of gain, 
through processes less slow than these, and less self-denying; and in this result, also, life 
insurance assimilates with gambling . . . .  
No man is so reckless as to remain in bed, when the house in which he is lying is 
on fire; but he may reside in a dilapidated house till it fall  and crush him, if the 
catastrophe is not imminent. So, if no life insurance would provide for our families, after 
our decesse, no heslth insurance or club would provide for ourselves during disesse, and 
bury us decently when desd, we should provide for these purposes by self-denying 
accumulations. 
8 1 .  See Clark, supra note 37, at 1 5-34, 78- 1 1 7  (tracing the interrelation between the seemingly 
opposed motives of risk aversion and risk taking in the insurance business through their gradual 
separation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) . According to Robin Pesrson, the prudential 
aspect of life insurance did not succeed the speculative element until some time after 1 850. See Robin 
Pesrson, Thrift or Dissipation: The Business of Life Assurance in the Early Mneteenth Century, 43 
EcON. HIST. REV. 236, 253 (1990). 
82. See FREDERICK MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LLOYD' S  AND OF MARINE INSURANCE IN GREAT 
BRITAIN 1 55-57 ( 1876) . 
83 . See Clark, supra note 37, at 67 (arguing that the passage of the Gambling Act of 1774, which 
prohibited wagering policies, "represented the first attempt to sunder activities that had previously been 
carried out in a common domain and to consign them to different operation and moral spheres"). 
84. See ZEUZER, supra note 9, at 72; see also SUPPLE, supra note 69, at 281 (reporting that in 
the late nineteenth century the established insurance companies attacked "valued policies, "  which paid 
a fixed amount in the event of loss, as being a "species of gambling"). 
85 . See, e.g . ,  Benjamin J. Foster, Insurance: Its History, Legal Philosophy, and Morals, 20 
HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 499, 499-500 (1849) (distinguishing "wager" polices from legitimate insur­
ance);  President Washburn, Insurance Not a Gamble, 51 INs. MONITOR 428, 428 (1903) (noting the 
"general misconception" that fire insurance resembles gambling) . 
. s i 1 
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courts, 86 to manage that association in a way that permitted the insurance 
enterprise to grow. 
In distinguishing insurance from gambling, insurance writers often 
relied on difficult-to-maintain intent distinctions (for example, insurers seek 
protection against losses, gamblers seek gains8'1) or subterfuge (for exam­
ple, equating life insurance and savings plans8� . On close analysis , these 
efforts are not particularly persuasive and seem much less satisfying than 
the appeal to self reliance, thrift, and acquisitiveness that overcame Divine 
Providence. Insurance and gambl ing are not only difficult to separate his­
torically, they are also difficult to separate analytically. 89 
In the end, the strategy of the insurance men was to separate insurance 
and gambling institutionally: Whatever "gambling" was ,  it was not some­
thing that "insurance" institutions would do. 00 Attention to moral hazard 
86. See, e.g. , Riggs v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. ,  25 N .E.  1058 (N.Y.  1 880) ( holding that a 
stockholder's insurance on a steamship was not a wager policy); In re Corson, 6 A. 213 ,  214 ( Pa .  
1 886) (affinning that a policy was a "wi.;ked spe.;ulation b y  wager i n  human life" where a nephew did 
not have an insurable interest in his aunt) . 
!d. 
87 . See, e.g. , Savage, supra note 44, at 160.  Savage writes: 
Insurance is, in reality, nothing more than a wager, for the underwriter who insures at one 
per cent, re.;eives one dollar to return one hundred upon the contingency of a certain 
event; and it is pre.;isely the same in its operation as if he had bet a wager of ninety-nine 
dollars to one that the property does not burn, or that a certain event does not 
happen. . . . But, in a moral point of view, it should be considered entirely different. 
The character of an act is detennined by its spirit, intention, and consequences. An 
individual that insures a bonafide interest, does it with a different intention than he who 
obtains a policy upon property in which he has no interest; for the latter hopes to make 
a gain, the former to prote.;t himself from loss[.] 
88 .  See Joseph B. Collins, Life Insurance, 26 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 1 96, 196 (1852) 
(replying to A.B. Johnson, and maintaining that " [l]ife insurance is simply a system of deposits for 
accumulation, over which the principle of average is extended for the prote.;tion of those who would 
otherwise suffer from the premature death of the insured") . 
89. Cj. Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J .  843 
(193 1) (explaining the problematic distinction between hedging and wagering in civil litigation); 
Homestead Fire Association, 3 INs. MONITOR 97, 97 (1857) ("[I]nsurance contracts partake so much 
of the character of wagers, that we do not feel at all satisfied that our courts would favor them among 
private individuals. Public policy should certainly discourage the transaction of Insurance in this way, 
for the tendency of the business, if left 'on the loose' would inevitably be towards gambling of a very 
desperate kind.") .  Even sophisticated contemporary observers still get tripped up in attempting to draw 
this distinction. See, e.g. , Francois Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES 
IN GOVERNMENTALITY 1 97, 201 ( Burchell et a!. eds . ,  1991) [hereinafter THE FOUCAULT EFFECT) 
("Risk is calculable. This is the essential point, whereby insurance is radically distinct from a bet or 
a lottery .") .  For a re.;ent attempt to distinguish gambling from insurance, spe.;ulation, and investment, 
see RUEVEN BRENNER & GABRIELLE A. BREHNER, GAMBLING AND SPECULATION: A THEORY, A 
HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN DECISIONS 90- 1 12 (1990). 
90. Research by cognitive psychologists suggests we are not far removed from this form of 
reasoning. In an experiment in which subje.;ts were asked whether they would be willing to pay a 
given amount of money in order to avoid a much larger loss in the future, the probability of which 
made the payment obje.;tively beneficial, the willingness of the subje.;t to mE.i.:e the payment depended 
on whether the payment was characterized as insurance. If the payment was " insurance," the subje.;ts 
1996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 259 
helped achieve that goal . For example, the common law "insurable 
interest" requirement (which was one solution to the temptation aspect of 
the moral hazard problem) declared that insurance policies sold to people 
who lacked an "insurable interest" were voidable "wagering" policies . In 
so doing, the common law legitimated all other policies as not wagering 
policies . S imilarly, the solution to the character aspect of the moral hazard 
problem-excluding "moral hazards" -allowed insurers to claim innocence 
by association :  Gambling is immoral ; people who gamble are immoral; we 
and the people we permit to buy insurance are moral (because we exclude 
the immoral); therefore, insurance is not gambling.91 
3. Crime. -The link between insurance and crime was a staple in the 
popular imagination, 92 as well as the insurance l iterature.93 The theme, 
once again, is insurance as temptation, and an important solution is ex­
cluding those whose character marks them as susceptible to that temptation. 
Because insurance offers an opportunity for crime, insurers need to, and 
do, exclude criminals (and those l inked in the popular mind with crimi­
nals) ;94 therefore (once again) insurance can be maintained as a moral 
enterprise. 
All this demonstrates a curious aspect of the insurer's moral hazard. 
What in retrospect appears to be a failure to extend the rationalizing tech­
nology of insurance to its full potential was no failure at all because it 
facilitated the broad extension of insurance practice. The rhetoric of moral 
hazard permitted the insurance men to deny that insurance broke with con­
ventional morality, and to believe their own denial, even as the enterprise 
wanted to make it. See Paul Slovic et al . ,  Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing 
Effects in Risk Assessment, in NEW DIRECfiONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE: QUESTION FRAMING AND REsPONSE CONSISTENCY 2 1 ,  26-28 (Robin M. Hogarth ed. ,  1982); 
Amos Tversk:y & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 2 1 1 
SCIENCE 453 , 456 (1981) .  
9 1 .  See, e.g. , TIFFANY, supra note 55 , at 20 ("This business is not a mere lottery or game of 
chance, but an honorable one in which some of the most experienced men of the age are engaged, and 
in which millions of money are invested .") .  
92. See supra note 6 1 ;  see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE 
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 1 1 4  (1985) (describing the perceived link between child life 
insurance and murder); DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount 1 944) . 
93 . See, e.g. , J.B.  LEWIS & C.C.  BOMBAUGH, REMARKABLE STRATAGEMS AND CONSPIRACIES: 
AN AUTHENTIC RECORD OF SURPRISING ATTEMPTS TO DEFRAUD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES (1878); 
Henry Mayhew, An Inquiry into the Number of Suspicious Deaths Occurring in Connection With Life 
Insurance Offices, 4 INs. MONITOR 73 (1 856) (describing London insurance offices' experience with 
fraudulent application and murder) . 
94. See DUCAT, supra note 44, at 133,  138  (listing as "uninsurable" theaters, museums, and 
shows) . Modem legacies of this practice include higher rates for publicans, reporters, and others. See 
Adam Hawk, Adam Hawk Asks Why Publicans, Journalists and Furriers Are Still Penalised by Motor 
Underwriters as Moral Hazards, and Asserts that Rating by Occupation is an Irrational Practice, POST 
MAG. , Oct. 10, 1 986 (reporting on British automobile insurance rating). 
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they built travelled down the road towards the abandonment of that moral­
ity in favor of a populational, actuarial understanding of the world.  95 Our 
present discomfort with at least some of the character aspects of moral 
hazard96 may simply reflect the success of the nineteenth-century insur­
ance men.97 
E. Insurance Talk and Insurance Practice 
As the Aetna Guide illustrates , nineteenth-century insurance writers 
prescribed two responses to the problem of moral hazard: excluding moral­
ly hazardous applicants and structuring the insurance contract so that no 
one could make a gain through an insured loss .  Looking back, it is easy 
to see in these prescriptions the straightforward, rationalist goal of the 
present generation of economist-insurers-identifying those insureds and 
offering them that coverage that will produce the most favorable ratio of 
losses paid to premiums collected . Observing the attention to moral hazard 
in the trade since then, it is also easy to conclude that the insurers' moral 
hazard prescriptions were central to achieving that goal . 98 There is a 
problem with this use of history, however. When it came to moral hazard, 
insurers may not have practiced what they preached, and their preaching 
may have served entirely different functions . 
Consider first the insurance agent's role in avoiding moral hazard. As 
today, insurance agents in the nineteenth century worked on commission. 
That commission depended on the amount of premiums collected, apparent­
ly without regard for the claims paid in return for those premiums.99 Yet, 
the measures which agents were told to use to control moral hazard­
exclusion of morally risky applicants and low insurance limits-reduced the 
amount of premiums an agent could collect. Thus , insurance agents had 
a temptation problem of their own: "The temptation which creates this atti­
tude is the commission paid without regard to the character of the services , 
and the measure of the temptation is the size of the commission. " 100 
95 . See Ewald, supra note 89, at 197 (describing insurance as an "abstract technology" that 
combines "various elements of economic and social reality according to a set of specific rules") . 
96. See HEIMER, supra note 13 ,  at 39 (arguing that the purpose of detecting bad character "is to 
classify risks to be insured rather than to exclude uninsurable risks"); Heimer, supra note 10, at 46-47 
(describing the link between character underwriting and the assumption that "immigrants and blacks 
were poor risks") . 
97. Cj. Jan Hacking, How Should We Do the History of Statistics, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, 
supra note 89, at 1 84 ("When there is a radical transformation of ideas, whether by evolution or by 
an abrupt mutation, I think that whatever made the transformation possible leaves its mark upon 
subsequent reasoning .") .  
9 8 .  See, e.g. , Olson, supra note 1 ,  at 233-34 (advocating the use of private insurance practices 
as a model for social insurance problems) . 
99. See TIFFANY, supra note 55, at 17 (reporting the general practice of paying 1 5 %  of premiums 
collected as commission) . 
100.  A.F. DEAN, Do Rate Cutting and High Commissions Lower Rates ?, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF FIRE INSURANCE, supra note 76, at 94, 99. The term "moral hazard" was not applied to this kind 
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While insurance manuals are full of warnings about such behavior, 101 
agents had significant control over the information that the home office 
received about applicants and could operate with l ittle oversight. 102 
The most compelling evidence that insurance agents used this control 
to avoid formal home office restrictions comes from the history of the 
valued policy laws enacted in the late nineteenth century. Valued policy 
laws made an insurance company liable for the face amount of an insurance 
policy in the event of a total loss, regardless of the value of the building. 
The laws were enacted in reaction to fire insurers' practice of selling insur­
ance policies with large face values and then, after a fire, refusing to pay 
more than the value of the building destroyed, even though the insured had 
paid premiums for "more" insurance.103 
A cardinal rule of fire insurance underwriting was (and is) "no 
overinsurance. "104 Yet, overinsurance was sufficiently common near the 
turn of the century that about half the state legislatures enacted valued 
policy laws . 105 If agents regularly violated the rule against overinsur­
ance, it is a near certainty that they also regularly obtained insurance for 
people that underwriters would have considered moral hazards . 
Consider also the role of the insurance contract in avoiding moral 
hazard. 106 Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, fire insurance 
policies have contained provisions that represent an effort to prevent gain 
of principal-agent situation until economists generalized the moral hazard problem. See, e.g. , 
Holmstrom, supra note 4, at 74 ("It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise 
when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect 
the probability distribution of the outcome.") .  
101 . See, e.g. , DUCAT, supra note 44, at 15 (admonishing agents not to "let your desire for 
premiums or commissions blind you" to potential risks) ; TIFFANY, supra note 55, at 1 7  ("Do not allow 
your better judgment to be biased by any temporary profit .") ;  METROPOLITAN MANUAL, supra note 
65, at 7 ("If the accounts of your Agents, therefore, show frequent deficiencies, excessive balances, 
disproportionate lapses, low collections, frequent transfers or excessive claims, your management will 
not be deemed satisfactory.") .  
102 .  See, e.g. , METROPOLITAN MANUAL, supra note 65, at 10 (instructing supervisors to test the 
business of new agents during the first few weeks, but afterwards only "as your judgment may 
dictate"); Samuel R. Weed, My Agency Experiences and Adventures Thirty-Five Years Ago, INs. 
MONITOR (HALF-CENTURY ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 1 853- 1 903), Dec. 1903 ,  at 45, 46 (" (A]bout all the 
information the company received was the policy number, the name of the insured, amount, time, rates, 
premium, beginning and ending, and a line or two stating whether it covered buildings or contents.") .  
103 . See SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 240-42 ( 1960) (discussing the 
enactment of a "valued-policy" law by the Wisconsin legislature, which pioneered the way for other 
states to do the same in reaction to industry overinsurance practices) . 
104. AETNA GUIDE, supra note 5 1 ,  at 157-59 . 
105 .  See KIMBALL, supra note 103 , at 241 .  Additional evidence of widespread overinsurance 
comes from admonishments to agents regarding other insurance. For example, Tiffany's stated that 
"one of the greatest errors made, has been the indiscriminate permission for other insurance to an 
unlimited amount" and that this error was made because "companies as a rule have been too anxious 
to secure the business to assert their rights . "  TIFFANY, supra note 55, at 45 . 
106. See HEIMER, supra note 1 3 ,  at 43 (describing the centrality of contract-based moral hazard 
control measures) . 
262 Texas Law Review [Vol . 75 :237 
through loss . 107 Examples include provisions l imiting payment in the 
event of loss to the "actual cash value" of the loss, regardless of the face 
value of the policy, 108 and a series of provisions voiding the policy in the 
event the insured's interest in the property is less than disclosed.109 
Because of yet another incentive problem (that of the insurance adjuster), 
the consistent application of these contract-based moral hazard control 
measures is almost as doubtful . Adjusters, like insurance agents, operate 
under only limited control from the home office and, therefore, have dis­
cretion to pursue their interests at the expense of the insurance 
company. 110 Because adjusters control the information that goes into the 
claim file, they can and do pay claims to avoid a fight, or for other rea­
sons , even when their superiors might prefer otherwise. 111 
Furthermore, as Professor Goble documented in an early twentieth­
century survey,112 the moral hazard clauses were so widely breached that 
insurance companies simply could not have insisted upon compliance. 1 13 
The practice then must have been similar to the practice today in which 
adjusters regularly waive such "technicalities" unless they have some other 
reason for objecting to the claim.114 While in theory that practice may 
enable a more finely tuned, situation-specific evaluation of the merits of a 
claim (which would inevitably involve a moral judgment about the 
claimant115) , determining whether that practice served that function is 
beyond our knowledge today. 
107 .  See generally George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance 
Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 410 ( 1937) (describing the history of the influential New York Standard 
Form and the moral hazard clauses within it) . 
108.  This is the provision that, absent the valued policy laws, enabled insurance companies to col­
lect premiums on the basis of the high value that the insured selected and then limit payment to a lesser 
amount at the time of loss. See KIMBALL, supra note 103 ,  at 240-4 1  (noting the insurance companies' 
attempts to protect themselves "against overinsurance through an indemnity principle, which restricted 
the policyholder's recovery to his actual loss, no matter how much the face of the policy might be") . 
1 09 .  See Goble, supra note 107, at 415 .  
1 10.  For ethnographic evidence regarding the "gap" between the rule and practice of insurance 
adjusting, see H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970); Tom Baker, Constructing the 
Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEXAs L .  
REV. 1395 ( 1994) ; Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net? Home Insurance and Inequality, 
21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 229 ( 1996). 
1 1 1 .  See Ross, supra note 1 10, at 204-09 (explaining how adjusters are ultimately responsible for 
deciding when to settle claims) . 
1 12 .  Goble, supra note 107 .  
1 13 .  Based on a review o f  property records and th e  moral hazard clauses i n  the standard form, 
Goble concluded that "28 % of all fire insurance policies on real property and 55 % of all fire policies 
issued on jointly owned real property are void and unenforceable under the law of Dlinois . "  Id. at 4 1 8 .  
1 14. See Baker & McElrath, supra note 1 10, at 250-51 & n.58 (describing the exercise o f  adjuster 
discretion and contract technicalities which could limit the insured's  recovery); Goble, supra note 107, 
at 426 ("The underwriters' reply to this is that if they believe the claimant to be honest, they will pay 
the loss despite the violation of a condition.") .  
1 15 .  See Baker & McElrath, supra note 1 10, at  251 (describing how adjusters make moral 
assessments of claims and claimants) . 
'! :' 
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Indeed, it was beyond knowledge then. About all nineteenth-century 
insurers could know was whether a particular line of business or set of 
agencies was profitable. 116 They had no reliable way to determine 
whether any particular moral hazard control measure made any measurable 
difference in the profitability of the business.  Because insurers openly 
cooperated in setting rates, writing contracts , and training personnel ,117 
there were no "controls" to use as a basis for determining whether chang­
ing the contract or company procedures offered a comparative advantage. 
Even if there had been controls,  undertaking the necessary analysis would 
have been insurmountably difficult. The relevant data were proprietary and 
maintained in incompatible ways by different companies; 1 18 contract­
based measures were introduced in tangled bunches ;119 there was no 
effort (or means) to track the losses of applicants rejected on moral hazard 
grounds; and insurance companies lacked what we now regard as essential 
tools-computers and multiple regression analysis . 120 Evaluating the 
relationship between no-fault liability and automobile accident rates, an 
exercise that has generated significant methodological hand wringing in 
recent years, 121 is easy by comparison. 
From this historical distance, however, it is possible to describe one 
function that moral hazard did serve at the claims end of the insurance 
relationship. The "claims story" of the immoral insured underscored (and 
still underscores) much of the work of the insurance adjuster. If insurance 
and crime (or fraud) are linked, then any claim is at least potentially 
criminal , and the insurer must investigate and value the claim with some 
1 16 .  See T .E. YOUNG & RICHARD MASTERS, INSURANCE OFFICE ORGANISATION, MANAGEMENT, 
AND ACCOUNTS 88-124 (1904) (describing the information recorded in the records kept by fire and life 
insurance departments); Weed, supra note 102, at 46 (" [A]bout all the information the company 
received was the policy number, the name of the insured, amount, time, rates, premium, beginning and 
ending, and a line or two stating whether it covered buildings or contents . ") .  
1 17 .  Cf. Lester W .  Zartman, Discrimination and Cooperation in Fire Insurance Rating, in YALE 
READINGS IN INSURANCE: FIRE INSURANCE 1 99, 2 1 5  ( Lester W. Zartman ed. ,  1 909) (describing 
insurance companies' attempts to set fire insurance rates relative to the actual risk) . 
1 18 .  See Ui. at 206 ("The fact to be kept in mind regarding all rates, schedule or otherwise, is that 
they have no statistical basis . ") ;  see also HEIMER, supra note 1 3 ,  at 54 (" [S]ince no two companies 
used the same classification system, when people did get around to trying to make universal rating 
schemes in the late 1 800s, what statistical evidence was available was essentially useless. ") .  
1 19 .  See W.F. Fox et. a! . ,  Report of Committee on Form of Policy, in PROCEEDINGS O F  THE 
SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FIRE UNDERWRITER'S ASS'N OF THE NORTHWEST 44-52 (1875) 
(discussing proposed amendments to the "National Board Form of Policy") . 
120. Francis Galton is typically credited with developing the concepts of correlation and multiple 
regression in the. late nineteenth century . See DONALD A. MACKENZIE, STATISTICS IN BRITAIN 1 865-
1930, at 9-10 (1981) .  The early applications of those concepts were primarily in the fields of eugenics 
and biology, largely through the work of Karl Pearson and W.F.R .  Weldon's biometrics school during 
the early twentieth century. See Ui. at 101 -D2. One of Pearson's graduate students, David Heron, left 
the biometrics school in 1 9 1 5  to become the chief statistician for the London Guarantee and Accident 
Co. ,  Ltd . See Ui. at 108-10. 
121.  See infra notes 2 1 1-18  and accompanying text. 
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care. 122 The insurance-fraud l ink makes this investigation a public 
service, not an effort to avoid an obligation. 123 When combined with the 
injunction that no insured should gain from a loss , the insurance-crime link 
can be a potent tool in the hands of the insurance adjuster.124 
Moral hazard also played a complementary role in the political theater 
of the insurance rate-setting process . The same industry that stressed 
character underwriting to its agents, and that stressed the morality of 
insurance to the public, told another story when justifying insurance rates . 
Like the claims story of the immoral insured, the rate story stressed the 
largely uncontrollable immorality of the insurance-buying public and, 
therefore, the need for high rates . 125 
In sum, rather than demonstrating that insurance agents or adjusters 
"in fact" did much to address moral hazard, or that doing so " in fact" 
would improve loss ratios, the emphasis on that subject in the nineteenth­
century insurance trade literature demonstrates only that the formal position 
of the home office was that agents and adjusters should do so. Thus, 
nineteenth-century insurance talk about moral hazard makes the effect of 
moral hazard (and moral hazard control measures) on loss ratios 
"probable" only in the sense that moral hazard is attested to by "respected 
people. " 126 
It is no less probable, and more so in the evidential sense of that 
word, that addressing moral hazard accomplished something quite different: 
The existence of a moral hazard problem legitimated high rates and a suspi­
cious approach to claims, and addressing that problem signified the moral­
ity of the insurance enterprise. These forgotten branches in the genealogy 
of moral hazard are at least as central to the constitution of the insurance 
enterprise as insurance incentives and loss ratios .  
122. q. WEED, supra note 54, at 120 ("[T]he investigation of the causes and facts [in adjusting 
a claim] follows very nearly along the line of inquiry which ought to precede the acceptance of the risk. 
This is particularly true of the moral hazard .").  
123 . See Baker, supra note l lO, at 1 410-14 (describing the " immoral insured" and "public trust" 
claims stories) . 
124. See Pat O'Malley, Legal Networks and Domestic Security, 1 1  STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC'Y 
1 7 1  (1991) (describing the roles of the residential property insurance adjuster in controlling moral 
hazard) . 
125 .  Thomas S. Chard, Manager of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, explained the reason for 
the increase in insurance rates as follows: 
No explanation offers except that we are contending against a growing moral hazard, a 
gigantic evil which now absorbs of underwriting assets from ten to fifteen million dollars 
annually, practically converting the business into a lottery, with a prize for every rascal . 
Chard, supra note 67, at 30 (emphasis in original); see also A.F. DEAN, Who Killed Cock Robin ?, in 
3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF FIRE INSURANCE, supra note 76, at 1 63 ,  1 75 ("[T]he chief contributory cause 
[of fire waste] is moral rather than physical . ") .  
126.  HACKING, supra note 3 6 ,  at 22-23 . 
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F. Moral Hazard into the Twentieth Century Insurance Trade 
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By the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the morality of insurance 
itself was no longer seriously questioned . Fire and life insurance were 
established, prosperous features on the American economic landscape, and 
other forms of insurance were to have an equally prosperous future. The 
focus had shifted from insurance as a threat to public morality to insurance 
as a public good itself worth protecting. 127 
The threat to this public good came not only from greedy insureds. 
The enactment of the valued policy laws and the Armstrong Commission's 
inquiry into the "extravagance and maladministration" and "artifice and 
double dealing" of life insurance companies128 mark the formal recogni­
tion by the state legislatures that greed was a reciprocal feature of the 
insurance relationship. While insurance companies could be counted on to 
use their best efforts to control greedy insureds-because it was in the 
companies' interest to do so-they could not be counted upon to control 
themselves . 
Moral hazard played a complementary role in efforts to control both 
sides of this relationship. On the insured side, moral hazard continued to 
be a conceptual lens underwriters used to decide who would be offered 
how much insurance. On the insurer side, moral hazard was a counter­
weight used to oppose state regulation in much the same way that the "rate 
story" of the immoral insured was used to justify high premiums. When­
ever the autonomy of the "private" insurance enterprise came into ques­
tion, insurers could be counted upon to explain how (immoral) insureds 
would take advantage of the proposed regulation to the detriment of the 
(moral) members of the public who depended upon strong insurance 
institutions . 129 
Through all this, the basic understanding of moral hazard remained 
unchangedY0 The term "moral hazard" retained both its character and 
127. See, e.g. , CAMPBELL, supra note 69, at 1 42-46 (decrying the link between insurance and 
crime and attributing it not to insurance per se, but rather to the practices of those in the insurance 
trade) . 
128. 10 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 346 (1906) . 
129.  See Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through 
Stories, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 1435, 1443-44 (1994) . 
130.  In a selective review of insurance writing from 1 900 through 1 960, I have detected no funda­
mental change in the understanding of moral hazard . Heimer's description of twentieth-century prac­
tices is consistent with this conclusion. See HEIMER, supra note 1 3 ,  at 37-39 (discussing the practice 
of "casual underwriting" as the traditional manner of evaluating potential policyholders) ; id. at 43-48 
(discussing the use of contract provisions to prevent insureds from fraudulently profiting from alleged 
losses) . More recent insurance writing reflects an influence from neoclassical economists. See, e.g. , 
C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. ET AL. ,  RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 14 ( Preliminary 7th ed . 
1 995) (defining "moral hazard" as "the tendency of insurance to reduce incentives to prevent loss") . 
But see UNDERWRITING IN LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES 1 12 (Richard Bailey ed . ,  1985) 
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temptation senses. While moral hazard situations expanded along with the 
insurance enterprise, the available tools to manage moral hazard did not. 
Insurers continued to conduct moral hazard investigations131 and to try 
to prevent loss from producing a gain. To the nineteenth-century pantheon 
of incendiaries, swindlers, itinerants , and the heedless, twentieth-century 
insurance writers added delinquents ,132 malingerers , 133 hypochondri­
acs/34 people with bad credit, 135 and those who pursue "aspirational , "  
rather than "medically necessary, " therapy.136 
There is one notable change in the insurance l iterature. Earlier writers 
rarely provided any support for the proposition that applicants who devi­
ated from (or were regarded as deviant by) conventional morality were a 
threat to the insurance enterprise. They seemed to regard this proposition 
as so obviously true that no demonstration was needed. Mid-twentieth­
century insurance writers, in contrast, were careful to support their 
conclusions by reference to "demonstrated underwriting experience. "137 
Of course, nowhere is any of this demonstrated in any fashion that can be 
evaluated by an impartial observer, in the manner, say, of the RAND study 
of health insurance.138 Underwriting guides and manuals from the period 
do l ittle to dispel the suspicion that "demonstrated underwriting 
experience" was and is nothing more than the conclusion that, because the 
insurance company continues to make money, conventional moral 
(defining "moral hazard" as "the likelihood that the proposed insured is making a deliberate attempt 
to conceal or misrepresent information that might result in an unfavorable underwriting decision") .  The 
increasing influence of economists is one reason I stopped my analysis of the insurance literature at 
1 960. 
1 3 1 .  See, e.g. , FRANK JOSEPH ANGELL, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 1 04-05 (1959) 
(describing the practice of using inspection reports to evaluate "the applicant's  habits, morals, and 
finances"); H.W. DINGMAN, INSURABILITY: PROGNOSIS AND SELECTION 190 (1927) (describing an 
"inspection service" which investigates the moral habits of applicants) . 
132. See Frederic R. Stearns, The "Moral Hazardw in Risk Appraisal Delinquency, 1 5 INs. INDEX 
90, 93 (1953) . 
133 . See G .F. MICHELBACHER, CASUALTY INSURANCE PRINCIPLES 384-89 (2d ed . 1 942) . 
134. See EDWlN J. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 328 (1960) . 
135 .  See Jane Birnbaum, A Poor Credit Rating May Affect Auto Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug . 27, 
1994, at 34. 
136.  See Steven S .  Sharfstein & Carl A.  Taube, Reductions in Insurance for Mental Disorders: 
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Consumer Demand, 139 AM . J .  PSYCHIATRY 1425 , 1427 (1982) . 
137.  For example, Frederic R. Stearns wrote that 
underwriting experience has demonstrated that potential delinquency may be present in 
individuals who conceal impairments, fail  to answer questions truthfully, frequently 
change their jobs without consistent motive and explanation, often change their place of 
residence without clearly recognizable reason, show in their previous history emotional 
instability, recklessness, violence, shady business dealings, extra-marital relations, 
promiscuity, not well explained divorces and separations, accident-proneness, suicidal 
attempts, etc. 
Stearns, supra note 132, at 93 . 
138 .  Manning et a! . ,  supra note 1 8  (documenting the RAND study) . 
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distinctions reflect real differences in the loss-producing tendencies of the 
populations so distinguished.139 
II. The Economist's Moral Hazard 
In the early 1960s, Kenneth Arrow was asked to analyze the econom­
ics of the growing health care sector of the U.S .  economy. As Arrow 
observed, a striking aspect of health care was (and is) the degree to which 
insurance pays for medical services, especially within hospitals .  140 The 
centrality of medical insurance led Arrow into the insurance l iterature, 
where he encountered the concept of moral hazard. This is the path that, 
through the law and economics movement, brought the concept of moral 
hazard into the legal and policy debate. To understand the place of moral 
hazard in that debate, it is worth spending some time with Arrow and the 
economists who followed him. 
Arrow reported the results of his "exploratory and tentative study" of 
medical economics in a 1963 article published in the American Economic 
Review. 141 In that article, Arrow announced his support for government 
provision of health insurance.142 In explaining that support, Arrow 
addressed the "moral hazard" of insurance, which he explicitly defined as 
139 .  See, e.g. , G .  WILLIAM GLENDENNING & ROBERT B .  HOLTOM, PERSONAL LINES 
UNDERWRITING 69 (1977) ("The use of occupation as an underwriting variable is based partly on 
accumulated individual experiences of underwriting personnel and partly on presumptions about habits 
and characteristics of people in certain occupational groups."); Regina Austin, The Insurance 
Classification Controversy, 1 3 1  U. PA. L. REv. 5 17, 534 (1983) ("However much the companies plead 
happenstance, insurance 'risk' classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social 
stratification that is familiar to everyone.") ;  Heimer, supra note 10, at 49 (" [I]nsurers simply consulted 
their prejudices and constructed their underwriting rules and investigation schedules accordingly. ") ;  
Deborah A.  Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18  J .  HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 287, 
296 (1993) ("The numerical rating system, and the underwriting guides and rating manuals it spawned, 
have all the trappings of scientific objectivity-medical terminology, elaborate matrices of diseases and 
point values, and numbers-but they often seem to be based as much on social prejudices and 
stereotypes as on empirical knowledge.") . 
140. See Arrow, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 958 (noting that "over half of all hospital expenses 
and about 35 percent of the medical payments of those with bills of $1000 a year and over" are covered 
by insurance) . The dominant third party payers historically have been Blue Cross and Blue Shield and 
commercial insurance companies. See Kenneth S .  Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, 
Social Insurance, and Tort Refonn: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 
COLUM. L. REv. 75, 80 ( 1993) (observing that in the late 1 980s, private health insurance, including 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and major medical insurance together paid roughly $ 1 85 billion of the 
approximately $220 billion in private insurance benefits paid annually) . Today, of course, government 
payments have assumed equal if not greater importance. Id. at 83 (noting that Medicare and Medicaid 
provided the "lion's share" of federally supported healthcare insurance in the late 1980s with $159 
billion in annual expenditures, followed by other federal and state insurance programs at $40 billion 
annually and two federal disability insurance programs at $35 billion annually) . 
141 . Arrow, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 944. 
1 42 .  See id. at 961 ("The welfare case for insurance policies of all sorts is overwhelming. It 
follows that the government should undertake insurance in those cases where the market, for whatever 
reason, has failed to emerge.") .  
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"the effect of insurance on incentives . "  143 Arrow described that effect 
as occurring when "the event against which insurance is taken out" l ies " in 
the control of the individual" who benefits from the insurance.144 As 
Arrow explained, individuals may have little control over illness, but they 
do have control over which doctor to use, and they may base that decision 
upon a doctor's willingness to use more costly medical services . 145 In 
the presence of health insurance, this control leads to two potential moral 
hazard effects : increased utilization of medical services and increased prices 
for those services . 
In a comment on Arrow's article published two years later, Mark 
Pauly challenged Arrow's support for government insurance and ascribed 
it to a misunderstanding of the economics of moral hazard. 146 Pauly 
faulted insurance writers (and implicitly Arrow) for using "emotive words" 
and asserted "that the problem of 'moral hazard' in insurance has , in fact, 
little to do with morality. "147 For Pauly, what Arrow and the insurance 
writers had called "moral hazard" was simply a rational response to a sub­
sidized price. The social effect of the problem was that of the familiar 
prisoner's dilemma:148 The collectively rational strategy (restrain use) is 
dominated by the individually rational strategy (more use) . 149 Pauly con­
cluded that the market's failure to provide broader health insurance re­
flected an inescapable need for "price rationing at the point of service"150 
so that people did not overconsume medical services . 
Arrow responded to Pauly in a few pages published immediately fol­
lowing Pauly's comment. 151 Arrow first applauded Pauly's insights into 
market incentives , but then took Pauly to task for "his exclusive emphasis" 
on those incentives . 152 Arrow agreed "that the seeking of more medical 
care with insurance is a rational action on the part of the individuals if no 
further constraints are imposed," but he went on to say that " [i]t does not 
follow that no constraints ought to be imposed or indeed that in certain 
contexts individuals should not impose constraints on themselves . "153 
1 43 .  ld. 
1 44. ld. 
1 45 .  See id. 
146. Pauly, Comment, supra note 4, at 535 n.3 . 
147.  ld. at 535, 53 1 .  
148.  See DOUGLAS G .  BAIRD ET AL.,  GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 48-49, 3 12-13  (1994) 
( providing a game-theoretical account of the prisoner's dilemma) . For a brief history of the prisoner's 
dilemma, see PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION 3-4 (Richmond Campbell & Lanning 
Sowden eds . ,  1 985) . 
149 .  See Pauly, Comment, supra note 4, at 534 (explaining that individuals are motivated to use 
"excess care" because the additional cost of insurance is distributed over other insurance holders) . 
1 50 .  Id. 
1 5 1 .  Arrow, Further Comment, supra note 4.  
1 52. Id. at 537 .  
1 53 .  Id. a t  538. 
I 
l 
j 
l 
l 
1 
\ 
I 
1 
t 
j 
� 
1 
I . j 
1 
1 
1 996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 269 
Then, in a sharp passage, Arrow wrote: "Mr. Pauly's wording suggests 
that 'rational economic behavior' and 'moral perfidy' are mutually exclu­
sive categories . No doubt Judas Iscariot turned a tidy profit from one of 
his transactions , but the usual judgment of his behavior is not necessarily 
wrong . "154 As Arrow put it, " [o]ne of the characteristics of a successful 
economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between 
principal and agent are sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat 
even though it may be 'rational economic behavior' to do so. " 155 Thus, 
morality, " internalized" moral principles , has much to do with moral 
hazard. 156 
Touche, one almost says on reading the exchange. But, without a 
concept of "character" or some other basis for identifying and discussing 
Arrow's "internalized moral principles , "  there is little that can be done 
with Arrow's observation. In the thirty years since their exchange, Pauly's 
criticism, and not Arrow's response, has had the greater influence. 
Tellingly, the subsequent economics literature (including Arrow's own 
contributions157) exclusively addresses external incentives , not 
" internalized moral principles . "  Indeed, despite Arrow's pointed criticism, 
Pauly's observation that moral hazard has little to do with morality has 
become the conventional wisdom. Before examining that wisdom, it is 
worth taking a closer look at the economics of moral hazard that Arrow, 
Pauly, and other economists have developed. 
A. The Basic Economics of Moral Hazard 
In broad outline, the moral hazard of economic theory is a denatured 
and more logically precise version of the temptation half of the insurance 
trade's moral hazard. If the insurer's answer to the insurance temptation 
could be captured in a slogan, it would be "never a gain from a loss . " 158 
1 54.  Id. 
155.  !d. 
156.  !d. Concerning the normative message contained in economic terms, Arrow has written: 
Both the conditions of this optimality theorem and the definition of optimality call for 
comment. A definition is just a definition, but when the de.finiendum is  a word already 
in common use with highly favorable connotations, it is clear that we are really trying to 
be persuasive; we are implicitly recommending the achievement of optimal states . 
Arrow, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 942. Arrow could not have been blind to the normative valence 
of "moral hazard" ;  his decision to use the term suggests a degree of comfort with that valence, as the 
exchange between Arrow and Pauly makes clear. Cj. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: 
Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & EcON. 1 ,  7 (1969) (criticizing Arrow's identification of moral hazard 
as a "special dilemma" and attributing it to "the people could be different" fallacy) . 
157. See, e.g. , Kenneth I. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles, 1974 
SCANDANA VlAN ACTUARIAL J. 1 .  
158 .  See, e.g. , AETNA GUIDE, supra note 50, at 1 57 ("The insured should never make money by 
a loss . "  (emphasis omitted)) . 
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The corresponding slogan for the economist would be "less loss from loss 
means more loss . "  
Let me explain. Assuming that money compensates for loss, it fol­
lows that insurance will cause a loss of a given magnitude to be felt by an 
individual insured as if it were a loss of lesser magnitude. After all, that 
is the very point of insurance. 159 The ratio of "actual" to "felt" loss in 
any particular situation will vary according to the extent to which insurance 
compensates for the "actual" loss .  
Assuming further (I will return to all these assumptions) that people 
are rational loss minimizers who are in control of themselves and their 
surroundings, that taking care requires effort and is effective, and that 
insurance companies do not condition payment on a given level of care, it 
follows that people will respond to insurance by taking less care, and, 
therefore, incurring more "actual" (but not "felt") loss . Hence, less loss 
from loss means more loss . This conclusion, together with the assumptions 
from which it follows, is the essence of the economist's moral hazard . 160 
In applying this analysis, economists make an important distinction 
between ex ante and ex post moral hazard.161 Ex ante moral hazard is 
the theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce the incentive to preserve 
property or life from loss , and it is akin to the arson or carelessness aspect 
of the fire insurance temptation problem. 162 Ex post moral hazard is the 
theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce the incentive to minimize the 
cost of recovering from loss, and it is akin to the malingering aspect of the 
disability insurance temptation problem. 163 With ex post moral hazard, 
the "problem" is not an increase in the frequency of accidents, but rather 
an increase in the consumption of the benefits provided by insurance, such 
as paid time off in the case of disability insurance. Ex post moral hazard 
can still be captured in the slogan "less loss from loss means more loss , " 
1 59.  See An Acte conc[er]ninge matters of Assurances, amongste Marchantes, 1 60 1 ,  43 Eliz . ,  ch. 
12 (Eng.) .  The Act states : 
!d. 
[B]y meanes of whiche Policies of Assurance it comethe to passe, upon the losse or 
perishinge of any Shippe there followethe not the undoinge of any Man, but the losse 
lightethe rather easilie upon many, then heavilie upon fewe, and rather upon them that 
adventure not then those that doe adventure, whereby all Merchantes, sp[ec]iallie the 
younger sorte, are allured to venture more willing lie and more freelie . . . .  
1 60 .  The leading articles setting out the economics of moral hazard are cited supra note 4.  
16 1 . See, e.g. , Priest, supra note 1 ,  at  1314 ("Moral hazard in the context of health insurance has 
been shown to represent a shift from ex ante allocative investments in care toward ex post investments 
in medical services which, given insurance, cost less at the margin. ") .  
1 62.  See George L .  Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1 52 1 ,  1 547 (1987) ("Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to 
prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance. ") .  
1 63 .  See id. ("Ex post moral hazard i s  the increase i n  claims against the insurance policy beyond 
the services the claimant would purchase if not insured . ") .  
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provided that the "loss" is understood to include the cost of recovering 
from the insured against event. While the ex ante/ex post distinction does 
not always work (for example, does an individual seek medical care to re­
cover from a loss or to prevent loss?), it helps to frame some of the 
discussion that follows . 
The most obvious difference between the economists' and the insurers' 
conception of moral hazard is the role of character in each. As I demon­
strated earlier, even the insurers' response to the "incentive" aspect of the 
moral hazard can be understood as an effort to make insurance less attrac­
tive to "moral hazards" -that is to say, to people with undesirable charac­
ter. While Arrow clearly demonstrated some regard for character, char­
acter nevertheless has disappeared from the economists' moral hazard 
analysis. In the process, moral hazard has become exclusively a property 
of insurance arrangements and not a property of the individuals who enter 
those arrangements . 164 
A second, and related, difference occurs in the metamorphosis of the 
insurance "temptation" into an "incentive. "  Where the insurance writers' 
"temptation" evoked a confrontation between good and evil, the econo­
mists' " incentive" evokes a cost-benefit calculation. Both temptation and 
incentive are matters of degree, but the concept "temptation" gives greater 
attention to the moral worth of the individual who responds (or not) to the 
temptation. "Temptation" also leads to a search for a trip point, the point 
up to which it is safe to go without concern that the individual will 
succumb to that temptation. 165 Hence, the fire insurer's concern about 
"gain through loss . "  That gain was a specific one: the ability to get more 
money from the insurance company upon the destruction of the insured 
property than through continued operation or sale of the property.166 The 
economists' " incentive, " in contrast, is a force that acts on a population. 
1 64.  What is left of character is addressed within the economic concept of adverse selection, a 
concept worthy of its own genealogical investigation (which will have to wait for another day) . 
Adverse selection refers to the tendency for insun,nce to be purchased by people who are 
disproportionately likely subsequently to experience an insured-against event. See Michael Rothschild 
& Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of 
Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629, 632 (1976) (noting that "those with high accident 
probabilities will demand more insurance than those who are less accident-prone"). Absent counter­
vailing efforts by insurance companies, the result is that the insurance pool will consist disproportion­
ately of "lemons" -people with undesirable risk characteristics. See George A. Akerlof, The Market 
for MLemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488, 492-93 (1970). 
165.  A recent advertisement for Wausau in a trade publication targeted at risk managers and 
employee benefits administrators suggests that there remains much vitality in this understanding. The 
ad is an elaborate picture of a snake encircling an apple, with the copy: "Fake an injury. Trick the 
insurance company into paying. Collect. Tempting, isn't it?" Bus. INs. , Mar. 6, 1 995, at 5. 
1 66. While it is always difficult to prove a negative, in reviewing the nineteenth-century literature 
I found no indication that the "gain" the insurance writers were concerned about was the pre-loss 
savings attributable to reduced care. 
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For the economist, gain is a matter of degree, and, absent some counter­
vailing incentive, insurance of any sort, in any amount, will change 
behavior. 
B. Universalizing Moral Hazard 
As Arrow and Pauly recognized in their 1965 exchange, the concept 
of moral hazard has far reaching application. In his comment on Arrow, 
Pauly pointed out that the concept applied to all forms of traditional 
insurance (automobile, marine, fire, health, etc .) .  167 In response, Arrow 
generalized moral hazard even further by suggesting that it is potentially 
present in any principle-agent situation .168 Subsequent writers,  most 
notably Joseph Stiglitz, have worked out Arrow's insight (and those of 
their own) in rigorous analytical form. 
As Stiglitz wrote in his most comprehensive analysis of moral hazard, 
" [a]lmost all economic relations are affected by risk, and by the problems 
of insurance and incentives to which this gives rise. "169 One of the most 
lasting contributions of the economics of moral hazard is likely to be this 
generalization .  After Arrow and Stiglitz, " insurance" is not simply some­
thing provided by "insurance companies . "  Instead, " insurance" is pro­
vided any time that one party's actions have consequences for the risk of 
loss borne by another. 170 
One familiar application of this insight appears in the l iterature on 
products liability. As George Priest recognized in his study of products 
warranties , a warranty is a form of insurance that manufacturers provide 
to consumers . 171 The warranty means that the action of the consumer­
use of a product that fails-will have an effect on the manufacturer (that is,  
1 67. See, Pauly, Comment, supra note 4, at  53 1 .  
168 .  See Arrow, Funher Comment, supra note 4,  at 538 . 
1 69 .  Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 8 .  
1 70 .  See Holmstrom, supra note 4 ,  at 75-91 ("It has long been recognized that a problem o f  moral 
hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately 
taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.") . 
The discussion in the text ignores the risk pooling aspect of insurance. If we define "insurance" 
as requiring not only risk transfer but also risk pooling, some of my examples would not be 
"insurance."  Limited liability, for example, distributes risk without pooling i t .  I am not sure that I 
agree that "insurance" must involve risk pooling . Regardless of the answer to that question, however, 
the economics of moral hazard depend only on the risk transfer aspect of insurance, not risk pooling. 
Thus, the question of whether limited liability "really" is a form of "insurance" does not affect the 
arguments made in this Article. 
171 . See Priest, supra note 1 ,  at 13 13  (noting that the problem of "an optimal division between 
the consumer and the manufacturer of allocative and insurance investments is identical conceptually to 
the problem of moral hazard which has been discussed extensively in insurance literature, in particular, 
in the context of medical insurance") ; see also Epstein, supra note 1 ,  at 646-47 ( implying that product 
liability functions as insurance for consumers) . 
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the expenditure of money to repair or replace the product) . 172 The more 
limited the warranty, the less insurance manufacturers provide to con­
sumers . As Priest described, when tort law refuses to give legal effect to 
limits that manufacturers seek to place on their warranties , manufacturers 
are, in effect, required to provide more insurance to consumers than they 
wish. 173 
Priest cited the economics literature for the proposition that insurance 
is inevitably accompanied by moral hazard and, from there, argued that a 
strict products liability regime would result in more personal injuries from 
products than a legal regime in which manufacturers and consumers are 
"free" to contract for the warranty they wish.174 Other law and econom­
ics writers have made similar moral-hazard-based arguments in favor of 
contributory and comparative negligence rules , 175 in favor of the as­
sumption of risk defense, 176 against awarding damages for pain and 
suffering, 177 and against what are claimed to be overly generous workers' 
compensation benefits . 178 The insight underlying all these arguments is 
that liability and compensation regimes are forms of insurance. The more 
expansive the liability or compensation regime, the more insurance those 
who bear the costs of the regime provide to those who are eligible to 
receive the insurance benefits . 
Universalizing moral hazard complicates this picture, however, be­
cause limited liability is also a form of insurance as writers who have 
examined the economics of shareholder liability and bankruptcy have 
recognized. 179 In nearly any relationship, each party to that relationship 
172 .  See Priest, supra note 1 ,  at 1308. 
173 . See id. at 1348 ("Courts have interpreted sales transactions to provide more extensive 
warranty protection to consumers than the manufacturers themselves have offered voluntarily. ") .  
174. See id .  at 1 35 1 .  
1 75 .  See, e.g. , Richard S .  Higgins, Products Liability Insurance, MoralHawrd, and Contributory 
Negligence, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 1 1 ,  130 (1981) (justifying the doctrine of contributory negligence as 
a needed corrective to moral hazard) . 
176.  See, e.g. , Epstein, supra note 1 ,  at 666 ("Assumption of risk is one way to prevent . . .  
moral hazard[ ] . . . .  ") . 
1 77. See, e.g. , Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tzer Ton lAw: Neo No-Fault &: Quasi Crimina/Liability, 
27 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 871 ,  888 (1992) ("The availability of pain and suffering damages . . .  
increases the wasteful and even fraudulent utilization of health insurance dollars in order to validate 
claims for pain and suffering. ") .  
178 .  See, e.g. , W. Kip Viscusi, Toward A Diminished Role for Ton Liability: Social Insurance, 
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 86 
(1989) (noting that moral hazard problems with workers' compensation programs are "most evident 
with respect to how soon workers return to work after suffering an injury"). 
179 .  See, e.g. , James R.  Garven & Steven W. Pottier, Incentive Contracting and the Role of 
Participation Rights in Stock Insurers, 62 J .  RISK & INs. 253, 253 (1995) ("Corporate limited liability 
' 
creates a moral hazard by generating a payoff structure that rewards owners with the benefits of risky 
activities while penalizing them with only a portion of the costs."); Kraakman, supra note 1 ,  at 874 
(referring to the "moral hazard" of limited liability in the context of corporate liability) . 
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can act in a way that may have consequences for any other party to the 
relationship. 180 Holding one party liable for those consequences reduces 
the incentive of any other party in the relationship to avoid those conse­
quences . Conversely, l imiting one party's liability for those consequences 
reduces that party's incentive to avoid those consequences . Thus , products 
l iability, workers' compensation and, indeed, most relationships present a 
multiple moral hazard problem. 181 Priest, Epstein, and other legal econo­
mists rightly assert that expanding manufacturers' liability transfers risk 
from consumers to manufacturers and, thus ,  increases the insurance manu­
facturers provide to consumers .182 But limiting manufacturers' l iability 
transfers risk from manufacturers to consumers and, thus, increases the 
insurance consumers provide to manufacturers . Put another way, if a strict 
products liability regime presents a consumer moral hazard problem, any­
thing less presents a manufacturer moral hazard problem. 183 
1 80 .  For an application of this principle to sexual relationships, see HEIMER, supra note 1 3 ,  at 
220-26, and to other nonmarket situations, including family relations, friendships, and employment, 
see Arnott & Stiglitz, supra note 13 ,  at 179-80. 
1 8 1 .  Some economists have referred to products liability situations as presenting a dual moral 
hazard problem. See, e.g. , Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, Product Warranties and Double Moral 
Hazard, 1 6  RAND J .  ECON. 103 ,  104 ( 1985); Winard Emons, Warranties, Moral Hazard, and the 
Lemons Problem, 46 J. ECON. THEORY 16  (1988) (both discussing the double moral hazard problem 
created by consumer warranties); Paul Lanoie, Occupational Safety and Health: A Problem of Double 
or Single Moral Hazard, 58 J. RisK & INs. 80, 81-82 (1991) (describing the double moral hazard prob­
lem created by employers providing insurance benefits to their workers); see also Dorothy Golosinki 
& Douglas S .  West, Double Moral Hazard and Shopping Center Similarity in Canada, 1 1  J. LAw 
EcoN. & ORG. 456, 456-57 (1 995) (listing various economic relationships which present a double 
moral hazard problem) . Even the double moral hazard account is overly simplistic, however, because 
it ignores other parties with interests in the relationship, such as the manufacturer's liability insurer, 
the consumer's first party insurer(s), the product vendor, and the entities that set and enforce products 
safety standards .  Where the product is used or consumed in the context of another relationship (e.g. , 
employment or family) , the situation is more complex. See Arnott & Stiglitz, supra note 1 3 ,  at 1 80 
(describing the effect that employer or peer monitoring of an individual has on an underlying double 
moral hazard) . 
1 82.  See Epstein, supra note 1 ,  at 646 (explaining that the historical justification for expanding 
manufacturers' liability is to shift risk to those with access to liability insurance); Priest, supra note 1 ,  
at 1298 (asserting that warranties act as insurance i n  that they shift the risk of repairing o r  replacing 
a defective product from the consumer to the manufacturer) . 
1 83 .  The argument that the "voluntary" nature of warranties makes them superior to the "forced" 
insurance provided by tort liability is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the argument 
requires a vision of "freedom of contract" that conflicts with what we know about contracting behavior. 
See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 213-15 (explaining how contracting parties are characteristically handi­
capped by limited information and limited information processing); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HA.Rv. L. REv. 1 173, 1237 (1983) (arguing that true free­
dom of contract cannot exist with the increasing use of adhesion contracts) . Second, it ignores the 
manufacturer "moral hazard" problem presented in contracting. See Mark Geistfeld, Manufacturer 
Moral Hazard and the Tort-Contract Issue in Products Liability, 1 5  lNT'L REV. L. & EcON .  241 ,  243 
( 1995) (arguing that a moral hazard arises from the ability of the manufacturer to take advantage of a 
consumer's ignorance of the true risks of defect in a product); cf. Hanson & Logue, supra note 1 ,  at 
166-69 (discussing the relative advantages of a tort regime over an insurance regime in efficiently 
allocating risk in proportion to an individual's degree of risk aversion) . 
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As the products liability example suggests, the economics of moral 
hazard are relentlessly relational . While early insurance writers saw moral 
hazard at work only in the behavior of the people who buy insurance, 
Arrow and Stiglitz would see moral hazard at work in the behavior of 
insurance agents, adjusters, underwriters and, indeed, in every aspect of 
the insurance company. S imilarly, while Epstein and Priest focus on the 
moral hazard affecting consumers, the economics of moral hazard point us 
toward manufacturers , retailers, their insurance companies , corporate and 
bankruptcy law, consumers' insurance companies, and even nonmarket 
relationships affecting products-related risks . 
C. Questioning Assumptions 
I will confess to having begun this project with the misperception that 
the one-sidedness of Epstein's and Priest's products liability analysis 
revealed a significant flaw in the economics of moral hazard. This 
misperception is attributable in part to the fact that moral hazard has 
largely been addressed in the law and economics literature as a problem 
that afflicts liability and compensation regimes which benefit workers and 
consumers, not as a problem that equally afflicts regimes more favorable 
to manufacturers and employers . 184 As we have seen, however, the eco­
nomics of moral hazard are anything but one-sided . 
Though this is pure speculation, I attribute the largely one-sided 
analysis in the law and economics literature to a phenomenon identified by 
the legal realists : that of the "givenness "  of entitlements . 185 If we 
understand the initial entitlement of manufacturers and employers to leave 
manufacturers and employers free to impose the costs of products and 
work-related accidents on consumers and employees (which is arguably the 
position of the late nineteenth-century common law), then we will regard 
legal rules that " interfere" with that entitlement as "redistributions . "  What 
is it that these rules redistribute? The rules redistribute the "risks" and 
"costs" of accidents . What else fulfills that function? Insurance. Thus, 
while the insurance provided in the redistribution of entitlements is 
analyzed, the insurance provided in the " initial" distribution is ignored. 
Once the relational nature of the economics of moral hazard is appre­
ciated, insurance and (its evil twin! )  moral hazard are instantly visible in 
any set of entitlements . But translating that vision into a plan for action is 
a serious problem for at least two reasons . The first reason is theoretical , 
and will receive no further attention here: Because of the relational nature 
1 84.  A recent exception to this generalization is Geistfeld, supra note 1 83 ,  at 243 (proposing that 
manufacturers benefit from moral hazards in their ability to hide defects from consumers) . 
1 85 .  See, e.g. , Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
3 8  POL. Sci. Q. 470, 472-77 (1923) (demonstrating the coercive effects of entitlements) . 
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of insurance and moral hazard, entitlements will inevitably present a 
multiple moral hazard problem that requires complex, iterative game theory 
techniques to model . The second reason is empirical : Once the modelling 
hurdle is surmounted, there remains the further hurdle of applying that 
model to the world. As careful economists acknowledge, the economics 
of moral hazard depend on a number of simplifying assumptions about the 
nature of the social world and the people who construct and inhabit it. If 
these assumptions do not fit the situation under analysis, there is good 
reason to doubt that behavior will be affected in the way that the theoretical 
model predicts . 
The assumptions underpinning the economics of moral hazard include 
the following: 
1 )  money compensates for loss ; 
2) people are rational loss minimizers; 
3) taking care requires effort; 
4) taking care is effective; 
5) people with insurance have control over themselves and their 
property; and 
6) insurance payments are not conditioned on a given level of 
care. 186 
Taking these assumptions into account, the careful claim with regard to the 
"moral hazard" of insurance is not simply that "insurance increases loss . "  
The careful claim is that to the extent that money compensates for loss , 
insurance against loss may reduce the incentive to take care, 187 which 
186.  For a recent, relatively accessible paper that sets out these assumptions (albeit not in such a 
precise form) , see Ralph A. Winter, Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
INSURANCE EcONOMICS 6 1 , 61-63 (Georges Dionne ed . ,  1992) . 
The statement of assumptions in the text is directed at ex ante moral hazard. The assumptions 
can be restated to fit the ex post context as follows: 
1 .  Money compensates for loss. In the ex post context, the "loss" sought to be 
avoided by "care" is the cost of recovery. Thus, this assumption might be 
reformulated as "recovery costs are monetary."  
2 .  People are rational loss minimizers. This assumption is directly applicable in the 
ex post context, provided that "loss" is understood to include the costs of recovery . 
3 .  Taking care requires effort. In the ex post context, "care" means choosing a lower 
cost loss recovery and "effort" means that there is some tradeoff involved in that 
choice. Another way to say the same thing is that the person making the choice 
between a higher and lower cost recovery prefers the higher cost one. 
4 .  Taking care is effective. Choosing a lower cost loss recovery reduces the costs of 
loss. (This may seem axiomatic, but it is not. Think of a situation in which the 
lower cost loss "recovery" choice is "do nothing" which then results in greater loss 
later) . 
5 .  Individuals have control over themselves and their property. Individuals who suffer 
losses are in control of what they do to recover from loss. 
6 .  Insurance payments are not conditioned on a given level of care. Insurance 
payments are not conditioned on how people recover from loss. 
1 87 .  Cf. Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 4, at 643 (using economic theory to suggest that providing 
insurance may, in limited circumstances, increase the care that an insured individual takes) . 
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may increase the amount of loss . But the amount of loss will increase only 
when (1)  the individuals who are insured can control the level of care, (2) 
insurance is not conditioned on care, (3) taking care actually reduces loss , 
and (4) those who are insured engage in rational loss minimization. 
The empirical validity of these assumptions is open to doubt. Indeed, 
a moment's reflection is sufficient for anyone to imagine situations in 
which each of the assumptions would be violated. Nevertheless,  when 
making policy choices I am prepared for normative reasons to act, until 
proven otherwise, as if people are rational loss minimizers188 and that 
taking care is effective. 189 In addition, I do not see any empirical basis 
for an extended quarrel with the proposition that taking care requires 
effort. 190 But, the remaining three assumptions-that money compensates 
for loss , that insured individuals are in control ,  and that insurance is not 
conditioned on care-seem sufficiently doubtful in important situations that 
they should be understood as setting real limits on a moral hazard based 
legal or policy analysis . 
1 .  Money cannot compensate for many losses . -Challenging the as­
sumption that money compensates for loss is standard fare in first year law 
school torts class.  Of course, we use money as compensation all the time 
because money is usually all that we have to use and because deterrence, 
and not just compensation, is at stake. So we hope and try and often 
manage to believe that the threat of monetary loss deters harm. It is easy 
188 .  This assumption actually conflates two distinct assumptions-the rational actor assumption 
and the risk-averse individual assumption. See Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing the centrality of 
the risk-aversion assumption) . For a recent statement of why, as a normative matter, we should be 
reluctant to challenge these assumptions, see Edward J .  McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why 
It Matters, 1 994 WIS. L. REV. 7 1 .  
There i s  a n  enormous amount of literature o n  the cognitive and other limits o f  the rational choice 
assumption that underlies microeconomic theory. See, e.g. , NORTH, supra note 14 ,  at 3-4 (examining 
the role institutions play in defining and limiting the set of choices available to individuals); Eisenberg, 
supra note 14 ,  at 2 13-25 (explaining how contracting parties often violate the rational choice model of 
contract construction due to limits of cognition); Ellickson, supra note 14, at 25 (arguing that the 
rational-actor analysis would benefit from "more realism about both human frailties and the influence 
of culture") . I do not mean to slight that literature or to suggest that one should always act as if people 
were rational loss minimizers. I mean simply to leave the well-known debate on the limits of rational 
choice outside this essay in order to focus on other aspects of the law and economics analysis that have 
received less attention. 
189.  For one example of what happens when people no longer believe taking care is effective, see 
1 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, at BK. 2, CHS. 48-54, at 124-29 ( B .  Jowett 
trans. ,  Oxford Clarendon Press 1881) (describing the breakdown of Athenian society during the 
plague) . The belief that taking care is effective may be what Nietzsche called a "necessary" error. 
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 1 47 n.37, 245-46 (Walter Kaufmann trans . ,  Vintage 
Books 1974) (1887).  
190. Cf. Shavell, supra note 4, at  546-49 (offering theoretical proof that the incentive effect of 
insurance disappears as the cost of taking care approaches zero) . 
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to see why insurance, which reduces monetary loss, might threaten this 
deterrence picture. 191 
The assumption that money compensates for loss is not categorically 
wrong; it is only partially wrong, and less so in some situations than 
others. For example, money surely replaces money. It is also a pretty 
good substitute for investment property and inventory (although the costs 
of proving and collecting a loss have always been positive in any world I 
have l ived in) . 192 Money also will rebuild, and might even replace, a 
home. But money cannot restore the sense of security lost when a storm 
destroys a home or when a thief breaks in. And money cannot replace a 
parent or a child, or s ight or health, or, indeed, much of what is important 
in life. 
If money does not fully compensate for loss, then liability and other 
insurance arrangements will have less of an incentive effect than the 
economic model would predict. 193 Pain and other nonfinancial aspects 
of bodily injury, for example, can be understood in insurance terms as an 
ineluctable, nonmonetary deductible or coinsurance "payment. " Thus, 
choosing between a true strict liability rule and a negligence rule for 
products-related injuries does not present a choice between "complete" and 
"partial" insurance for the consumer, but rather a choice between two 
forms of partial insurance. For the manufacturer, in contrast, money does 
1 9 1 .  Indeed, economists describe an inevitable insurance-deterrence tradeoff that is attributable to 
moral hazard. See, e.g. , Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 6 ("[ T]he more and better insurance that is provided 
against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the 
less they bear the full consequences of their actions."); see also Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, 61 AM . ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 3 80, 385 
(197 1 )  (describing how the insurer seeks "to achieve the optimal tradeoff between the conflicting goals 
of furthering risk spreading and providing appropriate incentives"). 
1 92. Thus, the common observation in the law and economics literature that the tort system is a 
no-deductible compensation system is simply not true. See, e.g. , Priest, supra note 1 ,  at 1309-13 
(exploring the idea of consumer product warranties as pseudo-insurance policies). The fact that an 
accident may sometimes decrease the marginal utility of money does not affect this analysis in any 
important way. In considering ex ante moral hazard effects, the proper inquiry is not "how much will 
it cost to compensate for this injury," but rather, "how good is the compensation available ex post as 
compared to the situation ex ante."  The fact that a spinal injury will change my taste for yachting 
hardly reduces my incentive to avoid a spinal injury . See generally Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price 
on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Detennine Ton Damages for Nonmonetary 
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 830-32 (1995) (calling for an ex ante approach to pain and suffering 
and criticizing the traditional law and economic analysis of tort compensation). 
193. In the ex post context, the assumption that "money compensates for loss" would be restated 
as "recovery costs are monetary." Clearly, not all costs of recovery from loss are monetary. Think 
of waiting in a doctor's office in the context of health insurance or the hassle of negotiating with con­
tractors in the context of homeowners insurance. Unlike the violation of the assumption that money 
compensates for loss in the ex ante situation, the violation of the assumption that recovery costs are 
monetary in the ex post context is likely to increase the incentive effects of insurance. Because insur­
ance pays the monetary costs of recovery, and only those monetary costs, people with insurance will 
spend insurance money in order to save their own time and trouble. 
\ 
1 
l 
1996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 279 
fully compensate for loss; the manufacturer's loss, after all ,  is not pain and 
suffering, but simply the money that must be paid to defend and settle the 
liability claim. As a result, the " insurance" provided to manufacturers by 
consumers in the form of limits on liability may well present a greater 
moral hazard (for manufacturers) than does the "insurance" provided to 
consumers by manufacturers in the form of liability. Thus, the economics 
of moral hazard do not support a reduction in manufacturers' liability. 194 
2. The people with insurance are only sometimes in control.-For 
insurance to reduce care, the people who stand to benefit from the insur­
ance must be capable of modifying the behavior that matters .  Yet, those 
who suffer losses are not always in control of their behavior. Even in the 
paradigmatic case of automobile accidents , the insured driver is only in 
partial control . Automobile design, road design, and traffic safety laws are 
just a few of the many institutionally controlled "causes" that l ie outside 
the control of any individual driver. Other types of insured-against events 
are subject to a similar analysis . 195 
Like the assumption that money compensates for loss, the assumption 
that people with insurance are in control is "wrong" in varying degrees in 
different circumstances . 196 To the degree this assumption is violated, 
moral hazard can become a sophisticated form of victim blaming. 197 If 
the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in control of the 
behavior that matters,  then reducing the insurance incentive will impose a 
cost on those people while providing little benefit in the way of reduced 
accidents . 198 Indeed, to the extent that the insured person is not in 
1 94.  This is not to say that there might not be other reasons for preferring less than complete strict 
liability in, for example, design defect cases. See, e .g. , James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Manufacturers ' Conscious Design Choices: The limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1 53 1 ,  
1546-47 (1973) (raising legal process objections to strict liability for generically dangerous products) . 
1 95 .  For example, the beneficiaries of workers' compensation use equipment that they did not 
make and work in places they did not design and do not control . Similarly, the beneficiaries of social 
welfare programs such as unemployment insurance and welfare have no control over local employment 
conditions or the macroeconomic forces that produce those conditions. 
196.  For a description of ways in which insurance companies vary the amount of insurance offered 
according to the control of the insured, see HEIMER, supra note 13 ,  at 1 94-95 . 
1 97.  See Richard Abel, A. Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 791-806 (1990) (discussing 
victim blaming and other perils of tort law) . 
198 . Once again, the ex post situation differs. As health economists have long recognized, the 
relevant post-loss decisionmaker is not always the insured person. See, e.g. , Arrow, Uncenainty, 
supra note 4, at 961-62. Doctors, for example, make important decisions in the context of health and 
disability insurance claims; contractors make important decisions in the context of homeowners insur­
ance claims; and lawyers and doctors make important decisions in the context of automobile liability 
insurance claims. 
In the ex post situation, violating the assumption that the insured is in control is unlikely to mean 
that insurance has no effect on claiming behavior. In contrast to the usual ex ante situation, the incen­
tives of third parties who have control in the ex post situation are directly affected by insurance held 
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control of the loss producing behavior, reducing the amount of insurance 
simply shifts the costs of loss to the unlucky; precisely the opposite of what 
insurance institutions are designed to do. 
In the liability context, reducing the insurance provided by the tort 
system may do more than shift the costs of loss to the unlucky; it may also 
increase accidents, once again because of the moral hazard of l imited 
liability. If, for example, employers have a greater ability to prevent 
accidents in the workplace than workers, then the insurance that workers 
provide to employers (in the form of l imited liability for workplace acci­
dents) would present a greater moral hazard than would the insurance that 
employers provide to workers (in the form of liability for workplace acci­
dents).  Similarly, if manufacturers have more control over the safety of 
their products than consumers, the insurance the consumers provide to 
manufacturers (in the form of l imited liability for products accidents) 
would present a greater moral hazard than would the insurance that manu­
facturers provide to consumers (in the form of liability for those accidents) . 
Thus, the moral hazard of reducing workers' compensation benefits or 
restricting products liability may well increase workplace or products 
injuries more than the moral hazard of increasing those benefits or 
expanding that liability. 
3. Insurance is often conditioned on "care, " especially in the ex post 
context.-While perfect information does not exist, there are at least a few 
situations in which the available information is good enough to enable an 
insurer to condition insurance payments on a given level of care . 199 
Examples include requirements for anti-theft devices, smoke alarms, and 
by others . See, e.g. , Richard J. Butler et a! . ,  HMOs, Moral Hazard and Cost Shifting in Workers' 
Compensation 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (finding that "doctors 
in HMOs have a greater tendency to classizy claims as compensable under workers compensation than 
do other physicians" and explaining that result as due to insurance incentives) . Indeed, the managed 
health care movement is based on the assumption that such third-party incentives-sometimes referred 
to as a "moral hazard" as well-have more effect on health care utilization than does the price paid by 
the individual insured. The Health Care Study Group, Understanding the Choices in Health Care 
Reform, 1 9  J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499, 5 1 2  (1994) (explaining that costs are controlled by "a 
conservative style of practice that results from organizational incentives for economy").  Thus, the ex 
post violation of the "control" assumption will not necessarily reduce the incentive effect of insurance 
(although it may make the operation of that incentive more complex) . 
1 99.  The assumption that insurance payments are not conditioned on care is a stand-in for the less 
intuitively understandable assumption of imperfect information. See Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 5 ("Moral 
hazard problems arise when there is imperfect information concerning the actions of [those) who 
purchase insurance, because those actions cannot be perfectly monitored and the insurance contract 
cannot specii)r all of the actions which the insured is to undertake." (citation omitted)); see also 
Holmstrom, supra note 4, at 74 ("The source of this moral hazard . . .  is an asymmetry of information 
among individuals that results because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted 
upon.") .  
1996] The Genealogy of Moral Hazard 28 1 
sprinkler systems200 and, after a loss, conditioning insurance claim 
payments on upgrading the security of the home or automobile.201 To 
the extent that insurers can control the care that insureds take (or, condition 
payment on care which is nearly the same thing) there is less chance that 
extending insurance will increase loss . 202 
Even when insurance is not conditioned on the care taken to prevent 
a loss, payment often can be conditioned on what is done to recover from 
the loss . For example, nearly every form of insurance is sold (or provided 
by the government) with some l imits on the manner in which an insured 
may recover from loss . For example: 
• liability insurance gives the insurer the right to defend 
and settle insured claims; 
• disability insurance requires the insured to be under the 
care of a doctor (and, increasingly, obligates insureds 
to undergo retraining and other forms of rehabilitation) ; 
• property insurance pays insureds who pocket the 
proceeds less than insureds who repair or replace the 
damaged property and also requires insureds to take 
steps to mitigate their losses ;  
• unemployment insurance requires the eligibl e  
unemployed to look for work; and 
• health insurance contains a wide variety of controls on 
utilization. 
Though there are exceptions, these general controls over an insured's 
ability to recover loss reflect the widespread agreement that insurance has 
a significant effect on what people do to recover from loss . 203 Such 
200. For a discussion of insurance arrangements designed to increase ex ante caretaking, see 
Donald R. Deere, On the Potential for Private Insurers to Reduce the Inefficiency of Moral Hazard, 
9 INT'L REV. L.  & EcoN . 219 (1989) . For a discussion of contracting on care in the fire and marine 
insurance industry, see HEIMER, supra note 13 ,  at 6 1 ,  202. For an argument that insurance companies 
should contract on care in order to reduce moral hazard, see Shavell, supra note 4, at 550- 6 1 .  
201 .  See O'Malley, supra note 124, at 177 (describing how home insurance adjusters condition 
claim payments on security upgrades) . The head of an automobile insurance claim department in a 
South Florida insurance office confirmed that similar practices are common in the automobile insurance 
industry . Interview with anonymous insurance company officer, in Coral Gables, Fla . (April 1995) 
(on file with author) . 
202. As Ralph Winter has recently argued, the economics of moral hazard under conditions in 
which the insurance company can contract on some level of care are not yet developed even in the 
theoretical literature. See Winter, supra note 1 86, at 88 .  Legal economist Seth Chandler has recently 
taken steps in that direction. See Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Ton System and LUlbility 
Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INs. L.J. 9 1 ,  93-94 (1996) [hereinafter 
Chandler, Interaction] . Using game theory and computer-assisted mathematical modelling, Chandler 
demonstrates that if insurers can control the level of care their insureds take, they lower the chances 
that extending insurance will result in increased loss. See Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Moral Hazard, 
1 CONN . INS. L.J. 97 (1995) [hereinafter Chandler, Visualizing] . 
203 . This is likely to be because, as explained in notes 193 and 198, in the ex post context, the 
violation of the assumptions underlying the economist's moral hazard will not reduce the incentive 
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controls also reflect widespread agreement, at least among insurers, that 
insurance institutions often can manage that effect. 204 This latter point 
is important: If insurance institutions can manage insurance incentives , then 
expanding the reach of insurance will not necessarily increase loss .205 
Indeed, and this is a crucial point, the success of insurers in managing 
insurance incentives may well mean that the most important " moral 
hazard" effect is not increased loss, but rather increased social control.  206 
Recent developments in health insurance illustrate this point. Even as 
economists have prescribed more self-reliance (deductibles and coinsur­
ance) as the solution to the moral hazard of health insurance, 207 some 
insurers have chosen social control .  208 Health maintenance organizations 
effect of insurance. Ex post, the "loss" that is affected by insurance is the cost of recovery . See supra 
note 186.  The violation of the assumption that the insured person is in control does not reduce the 
incentive effect of insurance because those who are able to control the cost know about the existence 
or nonexistence of insurance: bodyshops, contractors, doctors, lawyers, and so on. Similarly, the 
violation of the assumption that recovery costs are monetary will only increase the incentive effect of 
insurance. If there are additional, nonmonetary costs of recovery, the insured person will be less likely 
to exercise care in reducing the monetary costs of recovery. (The same phenomenon occurs when there 
are covered and uncovered costs. Think of the manufacturer who pressures a liability insurer to settle 
a case quickly in order to avoid the negative publicity of a trial.) 
204 . See HEIMER, supra note 1 3 ,  at 201-07 (discussing examples of conditions on insureds who 
seek to recover from loss in various lines of insurance) . 
205. The costs of administering the insurance scheme are not addressed in this analysis. 
Considering such costs would complicate the analysis without changing the basic thrust. It is possible 
that reducing benefits may reduce administrative costs, but it also possible that reducing benefits may 
not (if, for example, there are economies of scale in claims handling) . Arrow believed that there are 
substantial economies of scale in insurance arrangements . See Arrow, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 
961 . To the extent that administrative costs are substantial ,  there may be some social loss in insurance 
schemes, but this and other limitations on the standard assumption of actuarially fair insurance are 
beyond the scope of this analysis . My own admittedly impressionistic view is that, at least in the per­
sonal injury context, people are sufficiently risk averse that even substantial departures from actuarial 
fairness will not disrupt insurance markets (as long as the departures are more or less uniform among 
the insurance providers in that market, otherwise there would be adverse selection effects that are also 
beyond the scope of this analysis) . 
206. The theme of insurance and social control is under exploration in important work conducted 
by scholars working in the law and society tradition. See, e.g. , O'Malley, supra note 124, at 1 7 1  
(discussing the role o f  insurance adjusters i n  enforcing household security); Nancy Reichman, 
Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance Based Model of Social Control, 8 REs. L. DEVIANCE & 
Soc. CONTROL 1 5 1 ,  1 52 ( 1986) (describing how insurance is "increasingly integrated into the processes 
and practices of crime control"); Jonathan Simon, In the Place of the Parent: Risk Management and 
the Government of Campus life, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 15 ,  29-3 1 (1994) (noting that potential 
liability has led campuses to take a risk management approach to reduce loss) ; see also HEIMER, supra 
note 1 3 ,  at 1 84-93 (discussing the organizational solutions that surety and fidelity bonding companies 
have applied to the problem of insuring reactive risk) . 
207. See, e.g. , MARTIN FELDSTEIN & JONATHAN GRUBER, A MAJOR RISK APPROACH TO HEALTH 
INSURANCE REFORM 25 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No . 4852, 1 994) 
(advocating health insurance policies with a 50 % coinsurance rate and a 10% of income limit on out-of­
pocket expenditures); MANNING & MARQUIS, supra note 1 ,  at 3 1  (concluding that a coinsurance rate 
of 55 % would balance the marginal gain from increased risk pooling against the marginal loss from 
an increase in moral hazard). 
208 .  Cf STARR, supra note 20, at 429, 428-49 (describing "a general movement throughout the 
health care industry toward higher levels of integrated control") . As Starr notes, increased social 
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reduce the marginal price consumers pay for medical services and, by con­
trolling both doctors and patients, deliver a package of medical services at 
a lower cost than their traditional fee-for-service indemnification competi­
tion.209 In effect, HMOs have accepted the "hazard" that lower prices 
would increase utilization and have managed that hazard by controlling 
utilization. It is as if a fire insurer agreed to cover all loss from fire, 
whatever the cause, and then the insurer so successfully managed arson and 
other hazards that it was able to offer lower premiums .210 
4. Summing up . -As this discussion has suggested, ignoring the 
assumptions underlying the economics of moral hazard can produce pro­
foundly unrealistic expectations about the effect of real world insurance on 
real world behavior. Indeed, the failure to consider these assumptions, 
together with the mistake of equating insurance and redistribution, explains 
how the economics of moral hazard have been used to systematically favor 
the interests of manufacturers and employers over the sick and the injured. 
The mistake of equating insurance and redistribution results in a dispro­
portionate focus on the hazards of compensating injured consumers and 
workers as opposed to the hazards of not compensating them. The mistake 
of assuming that money compensates for loss and that the insured is in 
control of his situation results in the exaggeration of the hazards of that 
compensation. And, the mistake of ignoring institutions leads to the 
conclusion that the only solution for these exaggerated hazards is less 
protection for the sick or injured (which, of course, means less liability and 
lower insurance premiums for manufacturers and employers) . 
D. Measuring Moral Hazard 
Claims about moral hazard assert the existence of relationships that 
involve huge sums of money and which ought to be observable through 
social statistics . It is not surprising, therefore, that measuring moral 
hazard has become a distinct branch of empirical work, especially among 
econometricians . As the shakiness of the assumptions underlying ex ante 
moral hazard in the personal injury context suggest, however, the results 
control does not necessarily mean lower overall system costs; the increasingly integrated medical enter­
prises may use the social control to extract higher profits. Id. at 429 . 
209. See id. at 383 ("The record of the Kaiser Health Foundation suggested it was possible to 
provide high quality prepaid health care at 20 to 40 percent lower cost than fee--for-service medicine."). 
210.  Heimer reports that this is close to what the Factory Mutual insurance organizations did in 
the nineteenth century . See HEIMER, supra note 13, at 6 1 ,  6 1-67 (reporting that the Factory Mutuals 
were founded "specifically to encourage and reward loss prevention"). I do not mean by this 
description to suggest that HMOs have delivered on all that they have promised. Indeed, there i s  some 
evidence to the contrary. See, e.g. , FELDSTEIN & GRUBER, supra note 207, at 13 (discussing the 
"deadweight loss that results from the excessive consumption of health care services induced by the 
very low marginal cost of care under existing insurance policies"). 
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of empirical work in this area have called into question the effect that 
insurance actually has on the behavior of individuals who are exposed to 
injury. Results regarding ex post moral hazard point in the opposite 
direction, but not in the unequivocal fashion that the moral hazard theory 
would predict. 
1. Measuring Ex Ante Moral Hazard.-There is no strong evidence 
that insurance reduces the level of care individuals take to prevent bodily 
injury. Research on accidents has studied the effect that switching from a 
tort law to a no-fault compensation system has on automobile accidents and 
the effect that increasing workers' compensation benefits has on industrial 
safety. 
a. No-fault automobile insurance.-Neoclassical economic theory 
suggests that switching from third-party liability to no-fault insurance 
would increase accident rates .21 1 In insurance terms, eliminating liability 
results in complete third-party liability insurance. Because drivers would 
no longer be responsible for their harm to others, they would in theory 
have less incentive to be careful . In the early 1980s, Elisabeth Landes 
announced that she had empirical proof of this hypothesis ,212 but later 
research criticized Landes's  report and contradicted her findings .213 A 
recent re-analysis of these studies concludes that " no fault has a small but 
significant adverse incentive effect" on automobile accidents .214 The 
report uses the word "significant" in the technical sense, which means only 
that the effect of no-fault insurance does not result from chance or 
sampling error; it does not mean that the effect is "large" or "powerful" 
(which it is not) . 215 
2 1 1 .  See, e.g. , Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J .L. & EcON. 49, 60-62 (1 982) 
(examining empirical evidence of higher accident mortality rates in states that have switched to no-fault 
insurance schemes) . 
2 1 2 .  !d. at 65. 
2 1 3 .  See U .S .  DEP'T OF TRANSP. ,  COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP 
REPORT ON No-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE ExPERIENCES (1 985); Paul S .  Kochanowski & Madelyn V .  
Young, Deterrent Aspects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings, 5 2  J .  RISK & 
INs. 269 (1 985); Paul Zador & Adrian Lund, Re-Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance 
on Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RisK & INs. 226 (1986) .  
2 1 4 .  J .  David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, The Stochastic Dominance of No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance, 60 J. RISK & INs. 230, 233 (1993); see also Frank A. Sloan et al. ,  Tort Liability Versus 
Other Approaches for Deterring Careless Driving, 1 4 1NT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 53 , 56 (1 994) (reaching 
a similar conclusion while acknowledging that the United States does not present a good test of no-fault 
insurance) . 
2 1 5 .  See Cummins & Weiss, supra note 214, at 233 (using the term "significant" in the sense of 
"statistical significance"); cf DONALD N. McCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 156 (1985) 
(describing "the abuse of the word 'significant' in connection with statistical arguments in economics"). 
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Recent studies on the effect of the No-Fault Act adopted in Quebec in 
1978 suggest that the slight increase in fatal accidents in Quebec in the year 
following that act may have resulted from insurance incentives attributable 
to the Act. 216 It is difficult to draw much of a conclusion from these 
studies, however, because of the complexity of the Quebec situation and 
the disagreements between the analysts as to how to evaluate the effects of 
the Act. If there is an insurance effect, the author of one of the studies 
regards the "adverse selection" effect of the act (that is, riskier drivers 
entering the insurance pool) as much more significant than any moral haz­
ard effect, 217 and the author of the other study (which did not control for 
adverse selection) estimates the overall effect of the Act as being only half 
that of the decrease in the drinking age from twenty-one to eighteen.218 
Attention to the "money compensates for loss" and "control"  
assumptions explains these results . In  the case of  automobile accidents , 
money does not fully compensate for loss because the potential loss in an 
automobile accident is not only harm to someone else, but also harm to the 
insured driver. While, from the perspective of the insured driver, a lia­
bility loss may be fully compensable by insurance money (or nearly so), 
self-injury is not. Moreover, the insured driver is not fully in control .  
Automobile designers and manufacturers, highway safety engineers,  alcohol 
dispensers, legislators considering drunk driving laws, and police, not to 
mention other drivers, all contribute to the chances that an insured driver 
will have an accident, yet none of them is within the control of the insured. 
Automobile accident rates may go up or down, but not because of the ex 
ante moral hazard effect of automobile insurance, at least not in any 
important sense. 
b. Workers ' compensation.-Neoclassical economic theory sug­
gests that increasing workers' compensation benefits would reduce worker 
2 1 6 .  See RoseAnne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: A11 Analysis 
of the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499, 512-13 (Georges 
Dionne ed . ,  1991);  Marc Gaudry, Measuring the Ef ects of the No-Fault 1978 Quebec Automobile 
Insurance Act with the DRAG Model, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE EcONOMICS, supra, at 471 ,  
492. As Gaudry describes the Act, it i s  clear that increases in property damage and nonfatal bodily 
injury reports cannot be attributed to an ex ante moral hazard effect because of the greatly increased 
incentive to report such damage and injury. ld. at 483-84; cf. Butler & Worrall, supra note 1 ,  at 191  
(making this point in the context of  workers' compensation claims) . 
2 1 7 .  See Gaudry, supra note 216 ,  at 492-93 . Gaudry concludes that "very little of significance, 
if anything, can be attributed to the no-fault feature proper of the law."  ld. at 471 .  But see Devlin, 
supra note 2 1 6, at 499 (concluding that driving care fell as a result of no-fault) . Gaudry concludes that 
there was some moral hazard effect attributable to previously uninsured drivers being forced to carry 
insurance, but that the most important insurance effect results from a decline in the average quality of 
the stock of drivers attributable to the flat pricing of insurance under the Act. See Gaudry, supra note 
216, at 492-93 . 
2 1 8 .  See Devlin, supra note 216,  at 509-10 .  
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incentives to be careful and, therefore, increase workplace accidents . 219 
The empirical l iterature reports that the number of workers' compensation 
claims in fact has increased as benefits increased, but that serious accident 
rates have not. 220 Increasing benefits gives workers a greater incentive 
to report an accident, but increasing benefits does not reduce workplace 
safety.221 
Attention to the "money compensates for loss" and the "insured is in 
control "  assumptions helps explain this result as well .  Money does not 
fully compensate workers for bodily injury, and, under the prevailing 
model of industrial organization, workers do not control the design of their 
working environrnent.222 Thus, increasing benefits provides l imited 
incentive for workers to be careless,  and, even if it did, worker careless­
ness is only one part of the workplace safety p icture. 
c. Where else to look.-If attention to the assumptions underlying 
ex ante moral hazard would have predicted these workers' compensation 
and no-fault auto insurance findings, attention to these assumptions might 
suggest other places where insurance against loss would increase ex ante 
loss . A good place to begin would be situations in which the loss itself is 
financial , such as liability for damages in situations in which the potentially 
liable party does not face the risk of personal injury. 
Limited liability distributes to people who are injured the costs of an 
injury-producing activity. As discussed above, limited liability can be 
understood as a form of insurance which the injured provide to others 
engaged in an injury-causing activity. 223 Once limited liability is so 
understood, the workers' compensation studies actually vindicate a more 
sophisticated ex ante moral hazard analysis . 
Increasing the level of wage-loss benefits paid by workers' compensa­
tion has two simultaneous potential moral hazard effects-it increases the 
insurance provided to workers and it decreases the insurance provided to 
employers . 224 Because the assumptions underlying the ex ante moral haz-
219 .  See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS 
123 (1990) ("More generous benefits will lead workers to decrease their level of care . . . .  ") .  
220. See Butler & Worrall, supra note 1 ,  at 194.  As these authors are careful to explain, increases 
in the number of workers' compensation claims reported says nothing about the accident rate because 
of the claims-reporting effects of insurance benefits. Id. at 201 .  A recent overview of the accident 
literature concluded that the number of workplace injuries has remained relatively stable since 1 970, 
although the level of fatalities has declined. See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers ' 
Compensation and the Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 3 1  Hous. L. REv. 1 19,  1 40-44 ( 1994) . 
221 .  See MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 219, at 126 ("The results indicate that workers' 
compensation, on balance, serves as a fatality reduction mechanism . ") .  
222. See Spieler, supra note 220, at 1 56-57 (reporting that organizational factors accounted for 
the accident rate difference between employers) . 
223 . Cj. Kraakman, supra note 1 ,  at 874 (referring to the "moral hazard" of limited liability) . 
224 . See Lanoie, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 80. 
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ard analysis apply better to employers than workers , the ex ante moral 
hazard effect will be stronger for employers than workers . From the 
perspective of an employer, workplace injury is money, not pain, and 
money does compensate for money. Moreover, because the employer has 
more control over the design of the working environment, the employer is 
better positioned to act on that incentive.225 Thus , a properly nuanced 
moral hazard analysis would predict that, controlling for claims reporting 
effects , accident rates would not decline as workers' compensation benefits 
rise. 226 
2. Measuring Ex Post Moral Hazard.-As the foregoing discussion 
illustrated, the predictive capacity of economists' theoretical insights about 
moral hazard varies according to the degree to which the underlying 
assumptions are met in the circumstances . 227 Because the assumptions 
underlying ex post moral hazard228 seem more plausibly to have been met 
in the circumstances in which the theory has been applied, it is not 
surprising that there is substantial empirical evidence that insurance affects 
postloss behavior. For example, lower health insurance copayments lead 
to more doctors' office visits and hospital admissions,229 increases in 
workers' compensation benefits lead to increased reports of injuries (as 
opposed to actual injuries) and longer disability periods/30 and varying 
physician reimbursement rates for work and nonwork related sickness and 
injury affects the rate at which sickness and injury are diagnosed as work 
related .231 Whether the total costs of loss have been increased in all these 
situations, however, has not been demonstrated.232 Nor is it clear that 
225. I note further that the "rational actor" assumption better fits the situation of a bureaucratic 
employer than any individual insured. Cf. MAx WEBER, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization, in 
MAx WEBER ON CAPITALISM, BUREAUCRACY AND RELIGION 2 1 ,  24, 26 (Stanislav Andreski ed . ,  1983) 
(explaining rationality as a defining characteristic of bureaucratic firms) . 
226. For a recent discussion of why the experience rating of workers' compensation premiums paid 
by employers may have had less of a deterrent effect on workplace accidents than this analysis might 
suggest, see Spieler, supra note 220. Speiler' s conclusion-that organizational,  historical, and political 
factors swamp the incentive effects of insurance-is entirely consistent with my critique of the insurance 
as incentive analysis. See id. at 161  (concluding that " [s]afety and health appear[ ] to be an integral 
component of successful corporate culture, not a byproduct of high workers' compensation costs") . 
227. North makes a similar point about neoclassical economics generally. See NORTH, supra note 
14, at 20 ("In those instances where something approximating the conditions described above exist, the 
neoclassical model has been a very effective model for analyzing economic phenomena .") .  
228 . Comparisons between the ex post and ex ante forms of moral hazard appear supra notes 1 86, 
1 93,  198 and accompanying text. 
229 . See Manning et al . ,  supra note 18 ,  at 258-59. 
230 .  See Butler & Worrall, supra note 1 ,  at 191 . 
23 1 .  See Butler et al . ,  supra note 198,  at 5 .  
232. See Cam Donaldson & Karen Gerard, Countering Moral Hazard in Public and Private Health 
Care Systems: A Review of Recent Evidence, 1 8  J.  Soc. PoL'Y 235, 248 (1989) (concluding that " [t]he 
evidence is that free care at the point of delivery does not necessarily result in higher health care costs 
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these consequences deserve the opprobrium originally intended, and often 
still understood, by the term "moral hazard . "  
3. Questioning Moral Hazard.-At first, the economics of insurance 
seem to hold out the promise of simple solutions to complex problems. 
Just plug the legal rule or government program into the moral hazard meter 
and out comes the policy fix-usually the suggestion that there should be 
less " insurance" provided in the situation. Yet, instead of providing simple 
solutions to complex problems, the economics of moral hazard tell us that 
the problems are even more complex than we thought-insurance is every­
where, the world is a relational web, and a tug in one place changes the 
tension everywhere else. Even this web metaphor oversimplifies by sug­
gesting that the strength of the "tug" can be measured and the effect on the 
tension predicted. Because the economics of insurance rest on assumptions 
that inconsistently and unpredictably fit the world, the strength of the tug 
cannot be measured and the effect on the tension cannot be predicted. 
Given this complexity, any claim that the problem of moral hazard 
dictates a particular solution to a particular legal or policy problem cannot 
be demonstrably true. Indeed, any such claim is unknowable in precisely 
the same sense that the effect of moral hazard control measures were un­
knowable for nineteenth-century insurers : The data needed to answer the 
question have not been collected.233 Yet, even if we could accurately 
measure or predict the " increased loss" attributable to insurance, that 
measurement could not tell us what to do . 
Such a measurement could not tell us what to do because there is a 
final , crucially important limit on the economics of moral hazard. As the 
economist Richard Zeckhauser pointed out in an early article about long-
through increased moral hazard"); cf. Catherine S .  Elliott, Implication of Uncollectihles for Hospital 
Coinsurance Rates, 58 J .  RisK & INs. 6 1 6, 639 (1991) (arguing from empirical data that the "moral 
hazard" effect of health insurance is offset by savings attributable to reduction in hospitals' uncollectible 
billings) . For a discussion of why increased workers' compensation wage loss benefit claims do not 
indicate increased loss, see Butler & Worrall, supra note 1 .  Even the ex post moral hazard effect 
observed in the Butler study on physician diagnoses of work-related sickness and injury may not be 
deleterious.  See Butler et al . ,  supra note 198. All that study showed was a change in diagnostic 
patterns. I d. at 2, 5 .  It does not (and could not) prove that the diagnostic pattern under traditional fee­
for-service insurance is correct. It may be that patients with traditional insurance are under-diagnosed 
as suffering work related injury. If so, the observed change improves the cost internalization aspect 
of workers' compensation and appropriately shifts the loss from the health insurance pool to the 
workers' compensation insurance pool. 
233 .  In Duncan Kennedy's words: 
[ T]he move to efficiency transposes a conflict between groups in civil society from the 
level of a dispute about justice and truth to a dispute about facts-about probably 
unknowable social science data that no one will ever actually try to collect but which 
provides ample room for fanciful hypotheses. 
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 , 603 (1982) . 
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term medical care, 234 the economics of insurance ignore the benefits that 
insurance arrangements provide to parties who are not directly involved in 
the insurance relationship. In the health insurance context which 
Zeckhauser addressed, these benefits, or "positive externalities, "  include 
disease control, increased productivity attributable to working with healthy 
coworkers , and, perhaps most importantly, what he described as preserving 
the "myth" that health care at any price is a right.235 
Equally significant positive externalities exist in other insurance 
arrangements as well .  Consider once again workers' compensation. 
Workers' compensation supports family members and communities who de­
pend on workers' wages; workers' compensation also benefits coworkers 
whose health or safety would be compromised if injured workers stayed on 
the job. Perhaps more importantly, workers' compensation sustains the 
myth that employers take care of their workers, the myth that bodies are 
not manufacturing inputs, and the myth that people are more important 
than profit. A similar story could be told about the positive externalities 
of products liability rules, welfare benefits, social security, unemployment 
compensation, and the other ways in which society provides for the indi­
vidual and collective disasters that are a constant feature of the human 
condition. 
For all these forms of insurance, what is left out of the moral hazard 
equation is at least as important as what goes into that equation .  Indeed, 
what is left out of the moral hazard equation is that which makes possible 
the "relations of trust" and "internalized moral principles" which Arrow 
chastized Pauly for forgetting .236 Unless and until economic theory can 
bring these public goods into the moral hazard equation, the economics of 
moral hazard will systematically understate the benefits of social responsi­
bility, overstate the costs, and, in the process, provide unwarranted support 
for the current legal and political flight from responsibility. 
III . Conclusion 
It is easy to see why an economist like Kenneth Arrow would embrace 
the concept of moral hazard . It demonstrates in a rigorous way both the 
importance of contracting behavior to economic analysis and the complex, 
relational nature of risk. Indeed, pursuing concepts such as moral hazard 
helped Arrow and others make the case for moving beyond static 
approaches to economics . 
234. See Richard J. Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catasrrophic Illness, 21 PuB. POL'Y 1 49 ,  1 59-60 
(1973) . 
235 .  Id. at 1 64, 159-70 (describing both the positive externalities of health care attributable to 
reduction of contagion and the effects of putting into action a philosophy of health care as right) . 
236.  See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
·; ,, 
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The concept of moral hazard no doubt had a similar intellectual 
attraction for the legal economists who first imported it into the legal 
debate. The economics of insurance generally, and the concept of moral 
hazard in particular, provided Epstein, Priest, and Shaven, among others, 
with a theoretical basis for challenging the conventional risk-spreading 
arguments which led to the expansion of products liability. Using the 
economics of insurance, this first generation of law and economics scholars 
conclusively demonstrated that the world is more complex than conveyed 
in judicial opinions such as Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling.137 That a new 
generation of law and economics scholars has begun to use the economics 
of moral hazard to demonstrate that the world is even more complex than 
conveyed by the earlier generation is hardly a drop dead criticism of law 
and economic analysis . 138 The first generation responded to the analyti­
cal openings left by those who went before; the new generation has simply 
continued that tradition. 
The more significant criticism focuses on the performative dimension 
of moral hazard. The concept of moral hazard has been enlisted in support 
of an effort to reduce the public and private benefits available to the sick, 
the injured, and the poor. By "proving" that helping people has harmful 
consequences, 239 the economics of moral hazard legitimate the abandon­
ment of redistributive policies . And, by providing a scientific basis for this 
abandonment, the economics of moral hazard legitimate that abandonment 
as the result of a search for truth, not an exercise of power. 240 
237 .  150 P.2d 436,  441 (1944) (Traynor, J . ,  concurring) ("The cost of an injury and the loss of 
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the 
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business . ") .  Epstein discussed Escola in Products Liability As an Insurance Market, supra note 1 ,  at 
647, and in RICHARD A .  EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 36-48 (1980) . 
238 .  See, e.g. , Chandler, Interaction, supra note 202; Chandler, Visualizing,  supra note 202; 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D .  Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise 
Liability, 9 1  MICH . L. REv. 683 (1 993); Geistfeld, supra note 1 83 ;  Hanson & Logue, supra note l .  
239 .  One of the most evocative descriptions of the "deleterious consequences" of "directly helpful" 
social support is made by Amott and Stiglitz. They write: 
The importance of nonmarket insurance is illustrated by what happens if an 
individual catches pneumonia as a result of going on a hiking trip with inadequate rain 
gear. His employer gives him compensated sick leave; part or all of his medical expenses 
are reimbursed by his insurance policy or the state; uncovered medical expenses may b e  
partially deductible from his income tax; and family and friends rally round to provide 
other forms of support. Such extensive support, while directly helpful, deleteriously 
affects individuals' care to avoid accidents. In terms of the example, had the individual 
borne all the costs of catching pneumonia himself, he might have taken the trouble to 
carry adequate rain gear. 
Amott & Stiglitz, supra note 13, at 179. 
240 . This statement should not be understood to suggest that a search for truth is not an exercise 
of power, but rather to reflect the social fact that, 100 years after Nietzsche's death, the link between 
" truth" and "power" remains largely underground . 
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Yet, as we have seen, the moral hazard argument against social 
responsibility rests on four systematic mistakes : the mistake of equating 
insurance and redistribution, the mistake of assuming that money 
compensates for loss and that the insured is in control ,  the mistake of 
ignoring ways that institutions can manage insurance incentives ,  and the 
mistake of ignoring positive externalities . As a result, the moral hazard 
argument against social responsibility systematically undervalues efforts to 
protect the injured, the sick, and the poor and absolves those who are not 
sick, injured, or poor of their responsibility for that situation. In this 
manner, the economics of moral hazard have helped to frame the debate 
over responsibility for harm in favor of the interests of the economically 
powerful . 
Understanding the economist's moral hazard as encompassing its 
underlying assumptions, and not just as the logical result of those assump­
tions , might help reframe this debate. For example, because l imited liabil­
ity is insurance and because insurance increases harm whenever the econo­
mist's assumptions are met, the economics of moral hazard suggest that we 
should assign liability to those actors whose situation is most in line with 
the assumptions . In other words, the economics of moral hazard-properly 
understood-suggest that we ought to assign near complete liability to those 
whose losses are most compensable by money, who are most in control of 
loss-causing behavior, and who can best be counted upon to respond 
rationally to incentives . 
More importantly, however, recognizing that the economics of insur­
ance have thus far ignored the larger social benefits of insurance could lead 
us  to be more explicit about those benefits and, thus ,  better able to explain 
why and how we should share the burdens of life. After all , if there were 
a broad social consensus about the obligation to protect the sick, the 
injured, and the poor, and about the form that obligation should take, it 
would take more than economic analysis to dismantle the welfare state. 
Clearly, there is much more work to do . Hence, the "performative" 
goal of this essay has less to do with moral hazard itself than with the 
relative lack of attention to insurance problems by scholars outside the 
economics traditions. As we have seen, insurance ideas and practices 
define central privileges and responsibilities within a society. In that sense, 
our insurance arrangements form a material constitution, one that operates 
through routine, mundane transactions that nevertheless define the contours 
of individual and social responsibility. For that reason, studying who is 
eligible to receive what insurance benefits, and who pays for them, is as 
good a guide to the social compact as any combination of Supreme Court 
op1mons . 
This Article has defended this deliberately provocative claim by 
offering a genealogy of one such idea. While some readers may object that 
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I have not proved my case-or that the case is too diffuse for proof-it will 
be more than enough if I have persuaded those who still needed persuading 
that liberte, egalite, fratemite, and more, are at stake when we put moral 
hazard in play on the insurance field. Liberty: What limits will we place 
on what insurance institutions can do to control our response to insurance 
incentives? Equality: Is insurance only, or mostly, for the " moral , "  and 
who are they? Fraternity: Should we allow concerns about moral hazard 
to limit the solidarity insurance can provide? There is certainly no single 
or easy answer to any of these questions . But, as asking them demon­
strates, the ideas that inform insurance practice-and those practices 
themselves-deserve our careful attention. 
